

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

OCTOBER, 1970

THE SOVIET UNION, 1970

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Current History

OCTOBER, 1970

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What are the prospects for a lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970's? How successful is the Soviet system today? In this issue, seven specialists explore various aspects of foreign and domestic policies in the Soviet Union, and evaluate the United States reaction to those policies. Our first author points out that the United States and the Soviet Union "had moved out onto the world stage in the postwar era with a natural rivalry . . .," and concludes that "their struggle for power, combined with that of China, was not unlike the imperial competition among Britain, France and Germany a century earlier. . . ."

The United States and the Soviet Union: The Elusive Peace

BY NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

Professor of Modern American History, University of Virginia

WHAT CHARACTERIZED the United States-Soviet relationship during 20 years of cold war was an unchanging conflict in a changing international environment. So reassuring were the trends in world politics after the mid-1950's that many political leaders as well as academics and journalists regarded the East-West struggle as increasingly incongruous. Undoubtedly, the evolving complexities of international life eliminated the moral certainties of the cold war and forced some acknowledgement of change on the two superpowers. Some writers of the 1960's even referred to the cold war as a closed historical episode. Still, analysts and statesmen could record the evidences of pluralism and even of detente far more easily than they could construct the necessary intellectual and diplomatic foundations for new policies. The contrast between

the expectations of peace and the realities of confrontation measured the irreconcilability of underlying Soviet and American purpose. In Moscow and Washington alike, the cold war imperatives held firm.

That technology and nationalism transformed the international terrain after mid-century seemed evident by every standard. The continued application of technology to defense produced the missile race, which ultimately stripped nuclear war of all political and moral relevance. By the late 1950's, Stalin's successors had poured enough Soviet resources into jet bombers, nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems to achieve a nuclear stalemate. But the Soviet gains created no exploitable diplomatic or political advantages; instead they drove the United States into an expensive arms program which recaptured the balance and created a profound

strategic stabilization. The superpowers could aim their missiles only at one another, with the result that their massive weaponry curtailed, rather than enlarged, their freedom of action and their control of minor conflicts. The new destructiveness interlocked their interests in the nuclear balance. Even as Washington and Moscow translated their antagonisms into expanding arsenals, they sought safeguards against the very weapons they were creating.

At the same time, nationalism warred on the bipolarity fashioned by war and perpetuated at the level of military power by the missile race. West European recovery generated a revived confidence that undermined the close relationship between the United States and its European allies. Several inter-related developments produced an even more threatening deterioration of harmony within the Soviet bloc. The Sino-Soviet conflict not only placed a major restrictive force along Russia's Asian frontier but also weakened Soviet control of East Europe. Tensions within the Soviet system were evidence less of Kremlin failures than of the widespread rejection of Soviet leadership from the beginning.

The decolonization of Asia and Africa and the rise of nationalism throughout the underdeveloped world created a legacy of turmoil which dominated much of the international scene and placed additional restrictions on the influence of the superpowers. Amid the varied exertions of national will, Washington and Moscow could scarcely focus on one another. Too many lesser nations had entered the world stage as active participants. The United States and the U.S.S.R., Marshall D. Shulman observed, "are like two tired wrestlers whose ring is swirling with many former spectators, and whose bout has become something of a free-for-all."

Periodically, the behavior of the cold war antagonists appeared to reflect the new restraints imposed by the burgeoning multiplicity and the nuclear stalemate. As early as the Geneva summit meeting of July, 1955, the great powers acknowledged the need to resolve their differences without war. The

Berlin crisis of 1961, followed by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, demonstrated again the existing restraints on the use of power. At his news conference of January 2, 1964, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk enumerated further improvements in Soviet-United States relations which included the establishment of the "hot-line" between Washington and Moscow, the limited nuclear test-ban treaty, and the United Nations resolution that prohibited the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction. United States President Richard M. Nixon recounted the gains in Soviet-American relations in his lengthy report on foreign policy of January, 1970:

In this first year of my Administration we ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty; we made progress in negotiating arms control on the seabed; we took steps to further the prospects of agreement regarding chemical and biological methods of warfare; we engaged in talks on a Middle East settlement; and we began negotiations on the limitations of strategic arms. . . .

THE LIMITS OF CHANGE

Unfortunately, these manifestations of progress toward a stable world order had little bearing on either the power or the purposes of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Through 20 years, the Soviet-American confrontation remained remarkably stable. United States officials interpreted the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the first explosion of a Soviet atomic device, the Communist triumph in China, and the Korean War as evidence of a mounting Communist offensive which threatened to end in a major war. Still, even then the vast majority of Europeans and Americans did not share these fears. If these crises failed to materialize into major catastrophes, the reason lay in the absence of those ingredients of genuine confrontation which might have led to war, rather than in the astuteness of leadership or the state of military preparedness. Nor did the later crises over Hungary, the Suez, the Berlin Wall, or the Cuban missile bases really carry the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war. On the other hand, the evidences of improved Soviet-American relations created more the illusion than the

reality of peace, for all of those agreements or experiences lay at the periphery of the cold war. Each episode left the conflicting interests exactly where it found them. Through 20 years of cold war, Washington and Moscow experienced no defeat or victory, negotiated no major treaty or settlement, and reached no agreement on any outstanding issue of conflict.

Despite their commanding power, the United States and the U.S.S.R. wielded far less influence in world politics than they had 20 years earlier. For many statesmen and critics, their policies seemed irrelevant; their power, moreover, could impose only limited restraints on the behavior of the lesser nations. When opposing the forces of nationalism and even of limited military power, no nation could score any easy victories. Time had demonstrated that the world was tough and resilient after all. Convinced that the forces for stability were sufficient to guarantee the nation's security short of a major war, countless Americans agreed that the United States was expending far too much money and energy in upholding the status quo. Whereas the New Left condemned the conservation of the status quo as counterrevolutionary and unnecessarily repressive of social and political change, more conservative critics demanded that the Europeans and Asians share the expense of policies designed to protect their interests no less than those of the United States. For example, in February, 1970, Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., of Virginia called for a new realistic foreign policy that would lessen the immense drain on United States resources and reduce the risk of unwanted military involvements abroad. "In the bluntest terms," he said, "our country is over-committed. We cannot police the world—nor should we, even if we could." For Byrd, it seemed essential that the Japanese and the Europeans carry greater responsibility for their own defense.

That the American people carried a disproportionate share of the Western defense burden was clear enough. Between 1946 and 1969, Representative Otto E. Passman of Louisiana reported to Congress, the United

States expenditure for foreign assistance totaled \$182.5 billion—\$122 billion in congressional commitments and \$60.5 billion in interest. Between 1950 and 1968, United States gold holdings dwindled by more than \$12.5 billion, while short-term foreign dollar claims against the United States increased by \$27 billion. During that period, the deficit in the balance of payments totaled \$36.9 billion. Not even in Europe, where American policies enjoyed a moral consensus, did the allies approach the fulfillment of their obligations to NATO. United States policies in Southeast Asia lay outside the European consensus completely. Those South Koreans and members of SEATO who upheld the United States cause in Vietnam with rhetoric and token forces did so only under a variety of special inducements.

For many Americans, the vast expenditures for nuclear defense, aimed solely at the Soviet Union, seemed an unnecessary financial burden. Somehow, the security gains of 20 years had scarcely curtailed the arms race. With the emphasis on preparedness, the United States military establishment commanded each year about 10 per cent of the gross national product and about half the total federal expenditure. It was not strange that critics who could detect no challenge on the international horizon which demanded such appropriations attributed the country's domestic ills—environmental pollution, urban decay, crime and violence—to the policies, power, and very existence of the military-industrial complex. Why, many critics asked, was the level of the nation's military strength never high enough?

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT

President Nixon recognized the necessity of deflating policies that had become expensive, inflationary and divisive. In January, 1969, he inherited not only a costly and unpopular war in Vietnam but also a body of agreements which involved a United States military presence in 38 countries as well as numerous bases and installations abroad, which cost the United States almost \$5 billion each year. The armed forces had 3.4 million

men; these the President hoped to cut eventually by one million. In his foreign policy statement of January, 1970, the President warned foreign governments that they must contribute more to their own defenses; his Guam statement of July, 1969, laid down the principle that the Asian nations would receive no more than logistical support from the United States against future insurgencies.

Still, the Guam Doctrine had its limitations. In his effort to wind down the Vietnam war—now admittedly an insurgency—the President hoped to reposition the United States in the world so that its overseas commitments would be less burdensome. In the process, he did not alter the goals of United States containment policy but merely assigned the obligation for achieving them to the Asian nations. At the same time, the President reminded the nation that intractable hostility magnified the risks in United States-Soviet relations, declaring that the time had come “to place a premium on negotiation rather than confrontation.” The United States, he said, was prepared “to deal seriously, concretely and precisely with outstanding issues.”

This offer of negotiation raised two interrelated questions: Were the Soviets prepared to negotiate in the interest of reducing conflict? Was Washington prepared to offer terms which recognized the interests and the world position of the U.S.S.R.? Whatever the logic behind the search for agreement, specialists on Soviet affairs anticipated no conspicuous success. Some doubted that an opportunistic Kremlin had any interest in an orderly world.

The Soviet elite [Harvard Professor Richard Pipes informed the Senate subcommittee on arms limitations] tends to think in terms of perpetual conflict pitting right against wrong, from which only one side can emerge victorious. . . . Russian ideology with its stress on class warfare culminating in a vast revolutionary cataclysm neatly reinforces this. . . . Soviet behavior is motivated by fear . . . only the fear is not of other peoples but of its own and for that reason it is incapable of being allayed by concessions. Fear breeds insecurity which in turn expresses itself . . . in aggressive behavior.

In similar vein, Columbia University's Zbig-

niew Brzezinski wrote that “the fear of contagion . . . makes the Communist systems of the Leninist-Stalinist variety, which thrive on hostility, shrink away from unrestricted East-West collaboration.” Diplomatic experience was little more reassuring than such expert analyses of Soviet aggressiveness.

That the Soviet Union through 20 years of cold war had pursued highly limited objectives that only remotely suggested a goal of world conquest did not curtail Soviet rhetoric or the fears which Soviet words inspired. Professor Leonard Schapiro of the London School of Economics warned Americans in July, 1970: “Soviet policy is unremittingly dynamic. It is not directed toward achieving equilibrium, or balance of forces, or peace, or collective security, or certain specific concrete objectives; its ultimate aim is ‘victory,’ which means Communist rule on a world scale.” What appeared to render peace as elusive in 1970 as it had been at mid-century was the prevailing hard line in Moscow, backed by expanding naval as well as nuclear power. Senator Henry Jackson, the Washington Democrat, warned the nation that the U.S.S.R. “is now, for the first time in Russian history, a *global military power*. Looking ahead, the somber prospect is a Soviet Union increasingly bolder in its policies and more disposed to throw its military weight around to support its great power interests and to extend Soviet influence into new areas of the world.”

Such evaluations of Soviet policy by informed scholars and officials demonstrated clearly why the changing international environment had scarcely altered the character of United States-Soviet relations. Soviet ideology rendered what had always been a serious challenge for status quo powers almost insoluble, for unless nations shared a consensus regarding the underlying assumptions of international behavior, so the argument ran, there could be no true peace. Since the great democracies had resisted Germany's expanded role in the years before 1914, when that nation accepted generally the behavior patterns of the Western world, it was not strange that Americans feared and resisted

every Soviet presence outside Russia's historic boundaries. For Soviet expansion posed a danger not only to a worldwide open door for trade and investment but also to the West's security and independence.

Unfortunately, official United States objectives abroad were hardly less global than those of the U.S.S.R. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 had assigned the nation the purpose not only of containing Soviet expansion but also that of establishing a world order based on the principles of Woodrow Wilson. President Harry Truman reminded Americans that the task of helping others to maintain their national integrity against totalitarian aggression "is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." President Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisers defended the policies of escalation in Vietnam as an effort to strengthen world order. "Our generation has a dream," he told the nation in February, 1965. "It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make it come true. For centuries, nations have struggled with each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so." Secretary Dean Rusk declared repeatedly that United States policy in Vietnam sought the vindication of self-determination as a triumph for both world order and United States security.

Despite his emphasis on negotiations, President Nixon assured the American people that any cold war settlement would be based on the Wilsonian precept of peaceful change. "We will not," he said, "trade principles for promises, or vital interests for atmosphere." For the President, the nation's interests—those whose achievement alone could bring peace—were not specific. Rather, they comprised the worldwide acceptance of the axiom that a nation's interests cannot be furthered by conflict. "Only a straightforward recognition of that reality," he said, "... will bring us to the genuine cooperation which we seek and which the peace of the world re-

quires." The President had long shared the notion that until the Soviets gave up their goal of world conquest any peace for them would be a matter of necessity and not of choice. It was this recognition of a global struggle that prompted President Nixon to adopt a geopolitical view of the Soviet-American confrontation, popularly termed "linkage," designed to counterbalance negotiations over one issue with political, diplomatic and economic pressures at all other points of conflict.

THE GLOBAL POWER STRUGGLE

It was not strange that in 1970 United States-Soviet relations were characterized more by confrontation than negotiation. The two nations remained in direct conflict in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. In Europe, the clash of purpose eliminated any possibility of a stable security arrangement; still the two nations behaved circumspectly at every point of confrontation. Soviet control of East Europe, and with it Germany's division, remained the central issue of the cold war. Kremlin policy openly defied the United States principle of world order, but none of the regions under Soviet control in 1948 had regained their full sovereignty. Even Rumania, the most independent satellite, maintained policies generally in keeping with Moscow's outlook. The Brezhnev Doctrine of November, 1968, carried Soviet pretensions in East Europe beyond any previous declaration. Said the Soviet leader:

When the internal and external forces hostile to Socialism seek to turn back the development of any Socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order . . . this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but also a common problem of concern for all Socialist countries.

The doctrine was designed primarily to keep the westerly Communist states from edging too far either toward reform, as had Alexander Dubcek's Czechoslovakia in 1968, or toward excessive commercial and political relations with the West. The Kremlin had thus reminded NATO that East Europe was

its private preserve and that the Soviet system installed there remained inviolate. For President Nixon, on the other hand, the nations of East Europe were sovereign. He would accept no doctrine, he said, that abridged their right to seek reciprocal improvements in their relations with the United States and other nations. Still Western inaction during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, demonstrated again that United States principles far exceeded the nation's interests in Slavic Europe.

Meanwhile, some Soviet and Western leaders recognized the need of stabilizing the existing realities of a divided Europe. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* comprised a major search for European stability. The Soviet-West German treaty of August, 1970, closed a year of imaginative and pacesetting West German diplomacy.¹ The complex document recognized the German desire for national unity while improving West Germany's ties with the East and preserving her ties with the West. At the same time, the agreement acknowledged the Soviet desire to consolidate the East European buffer zone, including East Germany. Brandt gave up all West German designs on Germany's 1939 boundaries in exchange for new possibilities for trade, contacts and diplomacy with countries behind the Iron Curtain. Ratification of the treaty hinged in large measure on the success of Big Four negotiations over Berlin. The treaty in no way terminated the Kremlin's opposition to NATO or to the powerful United States presence in Western Europe.

Russia's ambitions in the Middle East were long established when the Soviets in 1955 gained a position of minor influence in an arms deal with Egypt. Thereafter, Soviet penetration increased with Egypt's growing fear and hatred of Israel. Egypt's defeat in the Six-Day War of June, 1967, completed Arab dependence on Moscow. At Glassboro in 1967, Premier Aleksei Kosygin reminded President Lyndon Johnson that there were

100 million Arabs and only 2 million Israelis. What disturbed Washington was not only the growing Arab threat to Israel but also the Soviet capability to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to the point of denying the West all commerce and friendship with the Arabs. This burgeoning conflict in the Middle East culminated in the spring of 1970 when the Soviets sent Russian pilots into Egypt to protect the highly effective Soviet-built antiaircraft missile bases against Israeli air assaults across the Suez. President Nixon warned the Kremlin that it ran the danger of elevating the quest for a sphere of influence to the level of a nuclear war. Perhaps it was the recognition that Soviet-American interests in the Middle East are not totally antagonistic that brought a Soviet acceptance of the United States peace initiative.

In 1970, Washington no longer viewed the struggle for Vietnam as a direct issue in Soviet-American relations as it did at mid-century. Still, both Soviet policy in Vietnam as well as Soviet ambitions in South and Southeast Asia remained a significant barrier to a total United States military withdrawal from the region. The United States maintained commitments to the defense of Thailand and South Korea. The Soviet-American rivalry in Southeast Asia had grown more, rather than less, complex with the passage of time, in large measure because of Chinese ambition and especially the Sino-Soviet competition in Asia. If the Kremlin had done little to help the United States escape from Vietnam gracefully, it had opposed, from fear of expanding Chinese influence, Hanoi's movements into Laos and Cambodia. In this continuing Soviet American struggle for spheres of influence

(Continued on page 241)

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¹ For the text of the treaty, see pp. 238 ff of this issue.

In discussing the policies of the Soviet leadership, this writer maintains that "The Kremlin still seeks to isolate the United States from Europe, to split the Western allies in NATO, to destroy the E.E.C. and eventually to draw East and West Europe together into a Soviet hegemonic security sphere without United States influence and presence."

The Soviet Union and West Europe

BY KURT L. LONDON

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A STUDY OF SOVIET policy toward West Europe must consider three major factors: Soviet relations with the United States, with Communist China and, particularly, with West Germany. The character of this policy depends on the outlook of the men in power; at present the neo-orthodoxy (or, as it is frequently called, neo-Stalinism) of Premier Leonid Brezhnev's regime has gained prevalence. Despite preoccupation with Middle East and Asian issues, the U.S.S.R.'s prime concern still is Europe. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko so stated in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in 1969.

This position will change only if full-scale war breaks out between the Soviets and the Communist Chinese. Although the possibility of such a war cannot be entirely discounted, chances weigh heavily against it although minor border clashes probably will recur. Moscow's European policy emphasizes first, its own sphere of interest in and suzerainty over East Europe where the Brezhnev Doctrine¹ has established the limits of political tolerance; second, policies toward West Germany and Berlin; and third, relationships with the rest of West Europe, including NATO, the E.E.C. and E.F.T.A.

Hovering over West Europe (and, of

course, over West Germany) is the protective might of the United States. Adjacent to the Soviet Far East lies the power potential of 700 million people, greedy for territorial expansion into the vast and empty spaces of Soviet Asia. Although Communist China is an ideological relative, her growing nuclear and military power contributes to Moscow's uneasiness, stimulating efforts to keep the quarrel within the confines of psychological warfare until, after Mao Tse-tung, a *modus vivendi* perhaps can be arranged. In the meantime, the Kremlin must look West and East.

Still, for the time being, the Politbureau almost certainly remains primarily concerned with the Soviet security position in Europe. There, Moscow has been unable to achieve its goals since World War II, although it has succeeded in maintaining control over all the East European states except Yugoslavia and Albania. The major hindrance to these goals is the power of the United States, which prevents the Soviet quest for hegemony over all of "Europe to the Urals"—former French President Charles de Gaulle's grandiloquent design in reverse.

DÉTENTE AND COEXISTENCE

The Kremlin does not want to risk nuclear holocaust. Thus, the Politbureau seems to have deemed it advisable to soften Western suspicions by making overtures apparently

¹ See Kurt London, "The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth," *Current History*, April, 1969, p. 197.

going beyond "peaceful coexistence." In this the Soviets have been moderately successful. Negotiations such as SALT for treaties on nuclear issues seemed to indicate Soviet readiness for a détente and spurred Western desires to achieve a lasting relaxation of tensions. Thus the August, 1970, conclusion of the Soviet-West German treaty renouncing force, disclaiming territorial designs against any state and establishing an inviolable status quo on Europe's frontiers was warmly received in the West and was enthusiastically hailed by most East European states.²

The document is accompanied by a letter from Bonn's Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, stating that it "does not conflict with the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination." There is no official Soviet reaction to this unilateral gesture. The treaty will come into force only after ratification by the *Bundestag*, and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt is committed to request ratification only if the Soviets make concessions on the Berlin issue. The treaty's future is uncertain.

If ratified, the treaty would assure Moscow of a status quo in Europe and a freer hand in dealing with the Chinese Communists. For West Germany, it holds the promise of increased trade with the East—a financial advantage for the West and a strategic gain for the East through the import of Western technology.

In considering these attempts to whittle down the cold war the question remains as to whether there really can be a détente and whether this term is subject to different interpretations East and West.

For us, the meaning is clear: détente means a relaxation of tensions which will create an atmosphere suitable for serious peace negotiations. For the Soviet leaders, *genuine* peace must await the demise of "imperial-

ism"; until then "peaceful coexistence" must do. But this latter term, like a coin, has two sides: on one we find accommodation to prevailing conditions (such as the nuclear deterrent); on the other, we note the continuation of the ideological struggle with all its political, social and economic implications. If the West strives for a genuine détente while the East merely maintains its "peaceful coexistence," one must assume that Soviet "détente" is no more than a method or tactic, certainly not a goal.³ The Kremlin still seeks to isolate the United States from Europe, to split the Western allies in NATO, to destroy the E.E.C. and eventually to draw East and West Europe together in a Soviet hegemonic security sphere without United States influence and presence.

RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE

The Soviet proposal, disseminated by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, was made for political, economic and military reasons. The official purpose was to improve Moscow's relations with West Europe. First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev summarized his position succinctly in his Kharkov speech of April 14, 1970, as a "realistic program to strengthen European peace." Such a program, he said,

provides for rejecting the use of force or threat of its use, recognizing the territorial status quo in Europe as it has formed since World War II, developing mutually advantageous trade, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations between all nations and states in Europe, regardless of the development of their social systems.

Since this proposal of the socialist countries was not directed against anyone's legal interests, asked the Soviet leader, who could be against territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and noninterference in the affairs of others? Brezhnev neglected to clarify whether these proposals pertained only to West Europe and whether the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty would remain in force in East Europe, but he made it clear that he wanted to maintain the *status quo* which draws the line—and a wall—between East and West Europe.

² For the treaty text see pp. 238ff. of this issue.

³ Cf. Kurt London, "The Strategy of Détente and Peace: Détente as Method or Goal?" in D. C. Collier and K. Glaser (editors), *The Conditions for Peace in Europe* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1969), Part II, 4, *passim*.

A security conference is old bait, hardly modernized since it was first proposed, in essence, by Vyacheslav Molotov in Berlin, 1954, and by Nikolai Bulganin in Geneva, 1955. The object then was to prevent West German participation in NATO. Nikita Khrushchev took it up again in 1958; in Bucharest, in 1966, the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee sought to promote an all-European Conference excluding the United States and Canada. Going far beyond previous plans by Adam Rapacki and Wladyslaw Gomulka, the agenda included the liquidation of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the elimination of United States forces from Europe, the dissolution of the Common Market in lieu of an all-European trade agreement, full recognition of East Germany by the West and the denial of nuclear weapons to West Germany.

The conference issue was raised once again in 1969 and, several months later, a conference of East European foreign ministers meeting in Prague emphatically repeated the Warsaw Pact's appeal, still limiting participation to Europeans. However, this time not only technical and economic cooperation but also cultural exchanges were proposed. Moreover, there were signs that the rigid position vis-à-vis United States and Canadian participation had softened.⁴

The real goals behind all these Soviet efforts have remained basically unchanged since 1954: the isolation of the United States from Europe in order to remove its influence gradually; the erosion and gradual elimination of NATO; prevention of European unity, both political and economic, and of Great Britain's entry into the Common Market; the achievement of a German peace treaty legitimizing Germany's division under international law and thereby confirming the present European frontiers. As a corollary, the achievement of these goals would strengthen the inner discipline of the East European bloc.

From the Western standpoint, the proposal

to scrap the Warsaw Pact as a quid pro quo for the dissolution of NATO is a naive concept shared only by naive politicians. The U.S.S.R. has bilateral mutual defense treaties with all its satellites and can easily direct military activities from Moscow; it does so anyway. Eliminating NATO would compel United States forces to return home and take their nuclear equipment with them and would decisively weaken West European cooperation which extends from the military to political and economic efforts at unification. There are few developments the Soviets fear so much as European political unification, the forging of both E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. into one West European Common Market, and the creation of a unified defense system. The establishment of a new, powerful bloc of states whose combined potential could withstand any Soviet threat possibly even without the help of the United States, yet endowed with United States backing, is a Soviet nightmare.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact means little to the Eastern bloc; the liquidation of NATO means everything to the West. Thus, emasculation of NATO or, even better, scrapping it, remains one of the foremost Soviet policy goals. As a beginning, a reduction of United States forces in West Europe would be greeted in the Kremlin with satisfaction; a similar reduction of Soviet forces on a man-for-man basis would give Warsaw Pact forces a vast conventional superiority. It is bewildering that certain American politicians refuse to recognize this all too obvious fact.

OPPOSITION TO THE E.E.C.

No such mutual scrapping has been suggested for the Common Market (E.E.C.) and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or CEMA), although Moscow surely understands that the E.E.C. as an organization is more advanced toward the goal of West European integration than is NATO. Not even former French President Charles de Gaulle's unfortunate policies were able to weaken the E.E.C. decisively. Developments since his political demise seem to indicate that eventually not only will Great Britain be-

⁴ For excerpts of statements issued by the NATO and Warsaw Pact conferences, see *Current History*, May, 1970, pp. 305ff.

come a member but that the E.E.C. might be enlarged to embrace E.F.T.A. nations as well. In the meantime, not to be outdone by the Western international banking system, in July, 1970, seven Communist countries will open a new intra-bloc bank more or less to compel the countries of the "socialist camp" to "invest" more capital in the U.S.S.R., especially for the exploration of oil and natural gas deposits in Siberia. Only Rumania has refused to participate. Whether the Soviets will be able to force capital investments by their satellites who need capital themselves will become more apparent later.

Soviet opposition to the E.E.C. is not only politico-economic; to a considerable degree it is ideological. In fact, the E.E.C. is a challenge to Marxism and Leninism. The Moscow Institute for World Economy and International Relations, created shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, was ordered to draft theses containing party-line arguments against the E.E.C.

Lenin had insisted that "contradictions" among mature states in the capitalist world were inevitable and reiterated in 1915 that "a United States of Europe was possible in the form of monopolists joining together to try to withstand the rise of the lower classes, but that such an alliance could be only temporary."⁵ Joseph Stalin reaffirmed in 1952 that capitalists' alliances could not prevent war among them. Thus, the creation of the E.E.C. constituted a greater challenge to the Kremlin and the C.P.S.U. (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) than NATO, because it went to the roots of the political and ideological differences between East and West. During the years following the E.E.C.'s creation, the Soviet attitude oscillated among aggressive propaganda, attempts at preventing it from absorbing Britain and E.F.T.A. and offers of E.E.C.-COMECON cooperation. Even diplomatic pressure was used, but it was not successful. Neither was the Soviet

suggestion for the creation of a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

It remained for Khrushchev to modify the Leninist thesis and to recognize that intra-capitalist contradictions were no longer acceptable as dogma; that an integrative organization such as the E.E.C. could be beneficial to capitalism and might even lead to a strengthening of the capitalist bloc which in turn would require a strengthening of the socialist bloc. If the capitalist countries were able to unite against the socialist camp, then it would become necessary to infiltrate the Common Market in order to "democratize" rather than disrupt it, in order to turn the Common Market to the benefit of the workers:

... the two main doctrinal changes were the recognition of integration of capitalist states as a higher stage historically than contradictions between them, and also that the "pauperization of the working class" which was supposed to accompany the demise of capitalism was no longer true, at least in regard to the Common Market countries.⁶

When de Gaulle vetoed the British application to the E.E.C. in early 1963, the Soviets felt constrained to renounce these modifications of Leninism by implication and changed their campaign against E.E.C. to conform with previous tactics. Whether they will change them again if French President Georges Pompidou no longer opposes British membership remains to be seen. Under the Brezhnev aegis of orthodoxy, the Khrushchevian attempts at reform and ideological modification will hardly be repeated, even though further strengthening and broadening of the E.E.C. will be difficult to interpret ideologically.

SOVIET TRADE

The Soviet onslaught against the E.E.C. has not deterred the Soviet Union from increasing its own trade and that of its satellites with individual Common Market nations, including West Germany. This applies particularly to the past five years, and it is noteworthy that Soviet trade with West Germany grew from \$281 million in 1965 to \$400 million in 1968; East European trade with

⁵ See David F. P. Forte's highly sophisticated essay, "The Response of Soviet Foreign Policy to the Common Market, 1957-63," in *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, January, 1968 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), p. 374.

⁶ Forte, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

West Germany increased from \$1,003 million in 1965 to \$6,010 million in 1968. Trade between the two Germanies has been lively for many years and seems little affected by political developments. However, West Germany's trade with the East amounts to only 4 per cent of its entire trade; United States trade with Eastern Europe amounts to only 0.4 per cent. During the last few years, Italy's trade with the East has grown surprisingly fast, while France's has remained sluggish.

The economic advantage is greater for the East, which has far more need for finished products and advanced Western technology. For the West, the advantage lies in the opportunities to penetrate Communist propaganda barricades and show its true face to the Iron Curtain peoples who are being denied access to Western cultural life.

Recent statements by Soviet leaders have revealed a fear of economic and technological backwardness. This fear is well-founded; only the armament industry appears to be in excellent shape. Consumer goods industries are those of an underdeveloped country. Economic reforms suggested by experts (such as Yevsei Liberman) under Khrushchev have fallen victim to the Brezhnev orthodoxy. Presumably the Soviet leaders realize that economic reforms require political liberalization which would amount to fundamental modifications of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This the present Kremlin rulers—and probably their immediate successors—will not permit.

Most West European trade with East European states is concentrated in Rumania and Hungary. Bucharest has maintained a relatively free hand and has refused to go along with COMECON restrictions. From the Soviet point of view, the mitigating circumstance is strict governance by the Rumanian Communist party, which conducts the affairs

of the land with virtually Stalinist control. Nevertheless, Rumanian economic relations with the West are relaxed and are limited only by Rumania's very restricted financial resources.

Hungary has very carefully followed a reformist line in her economy, always aware of Soviet observation. Her measures for improvement, each small and seemingly unimportant, are almost certainly approved by Moscow. Cumulatively, reformist actions have brought about a considerable improvement. In fact, it has been suggested that Hungary's cautious reforms may well provide an example for the Soviets. Trade with the West has increased but also remains within the limits of Hungary's capabilities—political and economic. There is relatively little trade with Czechoslovakia since the Soviet invasion. Polish economic relations with the West, especially with West Germany, do not appear to be very satisfactory. More than in other satellite states, except East Germany, Polish-Western economic relations are guided and probably determined by Soviet interests.⁷

THE FROZEN CAMPS

Anastas Mikoyan's son Sergo, a professor at the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs, recently stated: "The question of European security is, of course, tightly intertwined with Soviet-American relations."⁸ He quotes Willy Brandt as having said: "The Soviet Union itself is intensely interested in ameliorating tension in Europe."⁹ He supports the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee for a Pan-European conference on European security and cooperation, stating that the two camps are now frozen by "mutual restraint" or the "threat of massive retaliation."¹⁰ But if the result of such a security pact were to be the permanent division of Europe, it is hard to see the difference between the frozen camps and a status quo which the two camps presently feel constrained to maintain, not only for reasons of security, but also because of Moscow's disinclination to negotiate anything but military agreements.

⁷ For an excellent study in depth of East-West economic relations see Jozef Wilczynski, *The Economics and Politics of East West Trade* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).

⁸ Sergo Mikoyan, "NATO, the Soviet Union and European Security" in *Orbis*, Vol. XIII, Spring, 1969, No. 1, p. 62.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 66.

The SALT talks, the Geneva disarmament conference and the nonproliferation treaty are all in the interest of the U.S.S.R. as well as the West, but offer no political solution of the European stalemate. The NATO issue, Chancellor Brandt's parliamentary secretary has said, is not military security but the threat of Soviet political manipulation.¹¹

"At the root of the East-West impasse in Europe was and is Germany."¹² It is unrealistic to discuss a European security conference without being clear that the Soviets will not relinquish their control over East Germany. This satellite is firmly ensconced in the Soviet bloc through her membership in the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, backed by 20 Soviet divisions within her borders. Furthermore, there are no indications that the U.S.S.R. has given up the long-range goal of eventually extending its dominance over West Germany as well in order to establish "socialism" and thereby to isolate West Germany from the rest of West Europe. So long as this is not possible, the minimum Soviet requirement is to keep West Germany militarily weak.

These Soviet goals are as unacceptable to the West as is the never ceasing demand for a change in the status of Berlin. Both West and East are committed. The Soviet and East German demands for extending full Communist control over the entire city are not negotiable and therefore the problem will remain acute for a long time to come. Moves for a rapprochement between East and West and between the Soviet Union and West Germany cannot solve this problem which is so vital that a security conference can only reaffirm the present awkward situation of Berlin.

REDUCTION OF FORCES

Clearly, a meeting would have to concern itself with the status and strength of military

establishments. The issues of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are organizational as well as political; the question is whether the Soviets would be willing to reduce their forces in proportion to those in the West if United States troops were reduced or eliminated. So far, Western overtures have fallen on deaf Soviet ears. In the May, 1970, meeting of NATO's foreign ministers in Rome, United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers endorsed efforts by the Western allies for a "mutual and balanced reduction of the forces of the Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact" and called for an expression of NATO's desire for "progress toward a détente."

But the Soviets probably believe that they must maintain strong forces in East Europe not only as a measure of security vis-à-vis the West but also to insure their control over these states. Moreover, their traditional suspicions will prevent them from weakening what they may regard as their first line of defense in case of Western—particularly German—aggression. It is questionable whether the Warsaw Pact nations would accept NATO's suggestion to cut their forces by 30 per cent while NATO cut its ranks by 10 per cent.¹³ The NATO forces are somewhat larger; however, the proximity of the vast Soviet army and the facts that there are 3,000 miles of ocean between the United States and Europe and that United States nuclear weapons would have to be shipped home make the 30/10 cut proposal reasonable.

The NATO ministers in their Reykjavik Declaration of June 24 and 25, 1969, suggested that "mutual force reductions should be reciprocal and balanced in scope and timing" but the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Prague on October 30 and 31, 1969, argued for a "renunciation of the use of force or threat of its use," a much broader concept, much more difficult to pinpoint. They appended a plea for "economic, scientific and technical relations on the principle of equal rights aimed at the development of political cooperation among states in Europe." This proposition does not consider the balance of forces as it may develop after a European security pact has been discussed and the

¹¹ *Der Spiegel*, February 10, 1969, cf. Mikoyan, *ibid.*, p. 60.

¹² Timothy W. Stanley, *A Conference on European Security?* (Washington, D. C.: The Atlantic Council, 1970), p. 10. (Recommended reading.)

¹³ See "NATO Weighs Proposal to Soviet on Troop Cuts," *The New York Times*, May 12, 1970.

SALT talks have been successfully concluded. It seems somewhat unrealistic to pursue European security without a definitive decision concerning strategic arms limitations—provided an efficient control system could be established.

The problem of the renunciation of force which the Warsaw Pact raised was settled 25 years ago in the United Nations Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 4. It states that the members of the U. N. "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Perhaps the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee paid no attention to this U.N. clause because they wanted to present the idea as their own to a forgetful world, or perhaps they realized that neither West nor East Germany is a member of the United Nations.

The announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine which followed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and is valid in the "socialist commonwealth" demonstrates the fragility of Soviet security arrangements and points to the difficulties the West has in understanding Soviet policies. For example, while the Brandt government in Bonn championed a relaxation of tensions, the Soviets engaged in large-scale military maneuvers, increased their commitment in the Middle East and proclaimed the need for an exacerbation of the class struggle on an international scale.

In his exemplary study on the European security conference,¹⁴ Timothy W. Stanley carefully examined the rationale of the Soviet conference proposal: the conflict between Moscow and Peking, the sagging Soviet economy which needs trade with the West, the possibility that the Soviet leaders have at last changed their course to a more realistic attitude toward world politics and, possibly, the thought of utilizing West Germany's great economic strength for the benefit of the East. Yet while efforts toward a security

conference and, allegedly, a relaxation of tensions continued, the vituperative clamor against the West did not cease. Its decibels remind us of the worst years of the Stalinist cold war. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the Politbureau members regard the propaganda for a security conference as a tactical move to implement broader, long-range Soviet strategic plans.

These plans unquestionably mirror the philosophy of the Brezhnev regime, which has refused to adjust to the economic, social and political changes in the West. A moderate German weekly warns: "One cannot negotiate with Moscow and at the same time pretend that neo-Stalinism with all its implications does not exist."¹⁵ Thus, one might speculate that unless it could settle the crucial European problem of Germany, such a conference would exhaust itself in generalities.

Logic compels us to point out that an agreement to respect the status quo—which is what the Soviets want above all—is not necessarily identical with détente. Such an agreement settles nothing; it only postpones decisions which eventually must be made. Since Europe remains a Soviet priority concern, an agreement to respect the status quo without détente will serve as a truce of sorts during which Moscow will attempt to stimulate non-military encroachments throughout West Europe.

CONTINUING COLD WAR

The cold war, alas, is not over, although its appearance has changed and is camouflaged to some extent by negotiations or the promise of negotiations. But many in the
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¹⁴ See footnote 12.

¹⁵ *Christ und Welt* (Stuttgart), March 27, 1970, p. 4.

"The Soviet interest in East Europe continues to reflect the dual character of the Soviet Union as a great power with tendencies to regional hegemony and as the guardian of an ideological movement with universalist purposes."

Soviet Aims in East Europe

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THE SOVIET MILITARY occupation of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, signaled the Soviet Union's intention to reestablish its grip on a crumbling East European empire, and thus ushered in a new transitional phase in Soviet-East European relations. This phase has already shown Stalin-esque characteristics, but it should not be confused with the earlier Stalinist period. During the era of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union relied not only on Soviet military occupation or envelopment, but on a common ideological orthodoxy (from which there was no deviation), a reliable and servile local Communist party leadership, the psychological momentum of a dynamic and accelerating upsurge in Soviet power and prestige and, most crucially, on Stalin's charisma.

Today, the conspicuous role of the Soviet military presence as the chief vehicle of Soviet control in East Europe is revealed by the often forgotten fact that no less than four of the eight East European Communist states—Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland—are under some form of military occupation. Yugoslavia and Albania are lost to the Soviet bloc, while Rumania persists in limiting her military responsibilities and obligations to Moscow as the Soviet leaders desperately search for some pretext to station Soviet troops on Rumanian soil. Of the six remaining members of the Soviet bloc, the U.S.S.R. can safely rely only on Bulgaria to follow the Soviet lead without the presence or threat of Soviet troops.

Clearly, the Soviet leadership failed to transform Stalin's rigid neocolonial system into a socialist commonwealth of states. The common characteristic of the Communist countries, namely the "socialist system," was insufficient to generate a common interest. When a number of East European states began to chart their separate roads—not necessarily in the direction of "communism"—the incompatibility rather than the compatibility of interest within the bloc became clear. The basic divergencies of interest materialized not only in the domestic realm—threatening to undermine the common features of the socio-political order—but in foreign policy as well, posing a threat not only to the "socialist order" but also to Soviet security.

The Russian interest in East Europe antedates the establishment of the Soviet state; in this region both history and geography have impelled the Soviet Union to absorb the natural interests of Czarist Russia. Yet the precise character and configuration of the Soviet relationship with East Europe have been determined largely by the history of the relationship between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the world Communist movement, of which the prewar East European Communist parties were an integral part.

The Soviet interest in East Europe continues to reflect the dual character of the Soviet Union as a great power with tendencies toward regional hegemony and as the

guardian of an ideological movement with universalist purposes. And while this dichotomy persists, its character has undergone a subtle transformation. The establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in East Europe satisfied the historic and the strategic necessity of a security zone, and also provided a convenient springboard for the further extension of the Communist system. During the past decade, the balance between these purposes of the Soviet presence in East Europe has been drastically altered, as the Soviet role and position in the world Communist movement have been eroded in response to challenges from within and risks and obstacles from without. As a consequence, the Soviet leaders have been forced to re-examine the basic premises of their presence in East Europe and to face more realistically the uneven consequences of the further deterioration of their control.

During the first decade following World War II, Soviet leaders managed to coordinate their purposes in East Europe with minimum conflict. Soviet ideological purposes were at first dominant, but as the needs of security began to conflict with the demands of ideology, Soviet actions and decisions favored Soviet security and national interest over ideology and world communism. The Soviet Union was faced with just such a dilemma during the Czech crisis of 1968, and resolved it by giving higher priority to its interests as a regional hegemonical power than to its position as guardian of an ideological movement. Although the Soviet leaders justified their action largely in ideological terms, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia clearly reflected the dominance of the interests of the Soviet Union as a regional and global power.

THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

Before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, all Soviet interference in the internal affairs of East European countries had been defined in terms of intra-party relationships. When intervention was necessary, the Soviet party dictated or directed changes in the leadership structure and ideological orientation of the particular satel-

lite's Communist party which, in turn, altered the structure and composition of the government to introduce new policies and directions. Theoretically, there was no Soviet state interference in the domestic affairs of another state. While Soviet intervention in East European states was frequently blatant and ruthless, particularly from 1947 to 1953, the U.S.S.R. was nevertheless scrupulous in disclaiming any right to intervention and perennially reaffirmed its devotion to the norms of nonintervention and noninterference, and to the concept of the absolute sovereignty of states under international law. The Soviet leaders were thus careful to avoid any precedent that might justify intervention on the part of other powers.

The Brezhnev Doctrine, which was enunciated by Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev soon after the Czech occupation, thus must be viewed not only in its ideological dimension as a retroactive justification for the Czech occupation, but also in its substantive dimension as a warning that the U.S.S.R. was determined to preserve its dominance in East Europe even if it had to rely on military force alone. Although conceptualized as a collective or multilateral action, this doctrine enables the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in the affairs of any Communist state (Yugoslavia excepted) if, in its judgment, the internal socialist order of any Communist state is threatened with subversion from within or without. Theoretically, any Communist state enjoys the same right, but at this time only the Soviet Union possesses the power to exercise it. In some respects, the Brezhnev Doctrine resembles very closely the Monroe and Wilson doctrines, which have been multilateralized and institutionalized in the Organization of American States. In both instances, a collective or multilateral right to intervene in the affairs of member states is largely a juridical fig leaf concealing the unilateral right of a regional great power to intervene.

For the first time in its history, the Soviet Union has fashioned a theory that justifies in advance the right of the Soviet Union, as a state and not by means of the party, to in-

tervene in the affairs of another Communist state. The doctrine has been regarded as a doctrine of "limited sovereignty." On the grounds that the subversion or displacement of the socialist system in one country endangers its existence in others, each individual Communist state is precluded from the right to replace its socialist system with another.¹

THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY

The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, signed in Prague on May 6, 1970, was the first international document formally incorporating the novel conceptions of the Brezhnev Doctrine.² The fusion of party and state relations and state borders and ideological frontiers was clarified by this treaty, which was signed not only by the formal representatives of the state (which is the normal pattern) but also by representatives of the two parties. Thus, an international legal document bears the signatures not only of the two heads of government (Premiers Aleksei Kosygin and Lubomir Strougal), but the names of the two party leaders (Leonid Brezhnev and Gustav Husak) as well. The dual character of the treaty as a legal and ideological document was openly conceded by Husak, who said that it was based on the recognition that

Czechoslovakia's western borders are also the borders of the socialist camp, and that our state can develop only in close alliance and friendship

with the Soviet Union and other friendly socialist states.³

According to the Preamble to the Treaty, "The support, consolidation and protection of socialist gains . . . are a common internationalist duty of socialist countries," while Article 5 further incorporates the basic idea of the Brezhnev Doctrine that the defense of socialism is a multilateral obligation:

The High Contracting Parties, expressing unswerving resolve to advance along the road of building socialism and communism, shall take the necessary measures to defend the socialist gains of the peoples, the security and independence of both countries, strive for the development of all around relations between the states of the socialist community and shall act in the spirit of consolidating their unity, friendship and brotherhood.

The radical character of the new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty is that the two signatory states, in patent violation of a rule of international law that treaties create neither rights nor duties for non-signatories, undertake to engage in the joint defense not only of their own countries, but of the "socialist community as a whole."

The new treaty is deliberately ambiguous in certain respects, particularly with regard to identification of the targets against which the treaty is directed. Czechoslovakia's possible attackers were all adequately covered by existing bilateral and multilateral alliances, but when we survey the possible threats to the Soviet Union, it becomes obvious that the only gap in the system of bilateral alliances is China. Aside from an ambiguous Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid signed with Mongolia in January, 1966, the Soviet Union was not legally assured of a single ally in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict.⁴ The Warsaw Pact Treaty specifically restricts the obligations of the alliance members to provide assistance only "in the event of armed attack *in Europe* on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states."⁵ Thus, the Warsaw Alliance cannot be activated in the event of a Sino-Soviet war. Similarly, the relatively recent treaties with East Germany in 1964 and Poland in 1965 are closely tied to the

¹ Yugoslavia, Rumania and China have condemned the doctrine in varying degrees as being in violation not only of international law, but of proper norms of behavior among socialist states. While the Chinese leaders have condemned the doctrine, they have been insisting since about 1957 that they have a right under the rules of "proletarian internationalism" to call attention to Soviet doctrinal errors and even to rectify matters if necessary in the interests of world socialism. Conceivably, in the future, a powerful China might assemble a motley crew of Communist states and employ the Brezhnev Doctrine against its authors.

² Cf. *Pravda*, May 7, 1970, for the full text. All quoted provisions from the treaty are from this source.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. *Pravda*, January 16, 1966, for the full text of this treaty.

⁵ Emphasis supplied. The full text of the Warsaw Pact can be found in *New Times* (Moscow), May 21, 1955.

Warsaw Treaty, and are specifically directed at Germany.⁶ And the Soviet treaty with North Korea is directed against Japan or states allied with Japan.⁷ And while the treaty with Mongolia is no longer specifically directed against Japan (Japan is not even mentioned in the treaty), its military provisions are so vague as to make it difficult to define a *casus foederis*.

The provisions of the Soviet treaties with East Germany and Mongolia reveal them to be the most amenable to unilateral Soviet interpretation and manipulation, since both are explicitly based on the principles of "socialist internationalism," the doctrine which Moscow has traditionally invoked to justify intervention. Significantly and revealingly, the Soviet-Polish treaty, signed in 1965 (during the period between the 1964 East German treaty and the 1966 Mongolian treaty) does not mention "socialist internationalism."

The new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty reflects the blatantly ideological and hegemonic character of the alliance, as do the treaties with East Germany and Mongolia. It also articulates the Soviet Union's role as a global power in contradistinction to its posture as a purely regional power which has been reflected in all other existing treaties. While the substance of the treaty is heavily saturated with ideological rhetoric,⁸ the military provisions and the *casus foederis* are lucid and uncluttered with ambiguities, and are limited neither by geography nor ideology. Article 10, which contains both the activating clause and the definition of potential enemies, reads as follows:

If one of the High Contracting Parties is subjected to armed attack by some state or a group of states, the other Contracting Side, viewing this as an attack against itself, shall immediately afford it every assistance, including military assis-

tance, and shall support it by all means at its disposal.

The new treaty clearly obligates Czechoslovakia to join in any war in which the Soviet Union may become involved in its global concerns. In fact, unlike the Soviet treaties with East Germany and Poland, this treaty does not specifically mention Germany or German aggression. Furthermore, unlike the treaties with the other two members of the Northern Tier, the treaty with Czechoslovakia does not specifically guarantee Czechoslovakia's existing borders. Thus, Article 6 simply declares the Munich Pact to have been "invalid from its outset," whereas Article 4 of the treaty with the German Democratic Republic specifically states that "The inviolability of the national frontiers of the German Democratic Republic is one of the basic factors of European security," and Article 5 of the treaty with Poland stipulates that the "inviolability of the national frontiers of the People's Republic of Poland along the Oder and Neisse is one of the most important factors of European security." Instead, Article 9 of the Czechoslovak treaty declares that the postwar frontiers of all Europe are immutable:

The High Contracting Parties declare that one of the main preconditions for ensuring European security is the immutability of the state borders that were formed in Europe after the second World War. They express their firm resolve, jointly with the other member states of the . . . Warsaw Treaty . . . to ensure the inviolability of the borders of the member-states of this treaty and to take all necessary steps to prevent aggression on the part of any forces of militarism and revanchism and to rebuff the aggressor.

Article 9 attempts to impose the same obligations on the other members of the Warsaw Pact by linking the defense of the Warsaw Pact with the defense of the "socialist commonwealth," although the Warsaw Pact limits the *casus foederis* specifically to an "armed attack in Europe."

It should be emphasized that while all members of the Warsaw Pact are also members of the "socialist commonwealth," it is true that some members of the "socialist

⁶ For the treaty with the German Democratic Republic, cf. *Pravda*, June 13, 1964; for the Polish treaty, cf. *Pravda*, April 9, 1965.

⁷ Cf. *Pravda*, July 7, 1961.

⁸ "The whole content of the treaty is permeated with the principle of socialist internationalism," to use the precise wording of O. Khlestov, "New Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July, 1970, pp. 12, 13.

commonwealth" are not members of the Warsaw Alliance. The Warsaw Alliance, furthermore, according to Article 9, "is open to the accession of other states irrespective of their social and political systems," and is thus not technically an ideological alliance, since it is theoretically open to capitalist and other nonsocialist states. By linking the defense of the Warsaw Pact members with the defense of the "socialist commonwealth," the Soviet Union is attempting to ideologize the Warsaw Alliance in defiance of some of its members, most notably, Rumania.

The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, even more emphatically than the treaties with East Germany and Mongolia, legally transforms Czechoslovakia into an ideological and military protectorate of the Soviet Union. It is clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine, far from preserving a crumbling commonwealth, is designed to convert the commonwealth into a constellation of protectorates of the Soviet Union. The "socialist commonwealth" is to be protected not only from the United States, West Germany and Japan, but also from China, although China is ostensibly a member of the "commonwealth."

THREE DANGERS

The Soviet leaders perceive three major external sources of possible intrusion in their East European sphere: the United States, China, and West Germany. For more than a decade, they have been denouncing an alleged Bonn-Washington axis within NATO, and in more recent years they have publicly conjured up nightmares of a Sino-American combine in the East constituting one side of a giant nutcracker working in concert with a German-American axis in the West. Since the United States plays a prominent role in both hallucinations, because of its overarching

global position, it might not take too much uncontrolled imagination to conjure up the image of an artful United States skilfully orchestrating a squeeze play, employing Bonn as its instrument in the West and Peking as its unwitting foil in the East. The force of this nightmare, however, has been substantially mitigated because of the domestic disturbances and eroding social consensus within the United States and the quagmire of war in Vietnam, both of which have served to blunt United States will and purpose to function as a militant global power.

It has been the grand strategy of Khrushchev's successors to deal with each of their main rivals within the context of an overall design embracing policies on three separate levels, each corresponding to one of the three threats.⁹ With the United States, the Soviet leaders operate at the global level, in terms of strategic balances, nuclear stockpiles, missile development and overall rivalry in all parts of the globe. The arena within which the Soviet Union contests China is somewhat smaller and is restricted largely to the world Communist movement and the Third World. East Europe is relevant to the Sino-Soviet confrontation only because it is part of the ideological arena.

Within this context, West Germany operates in the smallest arena of all, at the regional level, but Bonn's choice of battlefields is precisely Moscow's East European garden. Consequently, East Europe has become the primary focus of West Germany's challenge. But since the Soviet sphere of influence in East Europe is the irreducible *desiderata* underpinning the Soviet Union's existence as a hegemonic power, West Germany's *Ostpolitik* threatens the foundations of the Soviet role as a global power and an ideological center.

Bonn's *Ostpolitik*, which was cautiously initiated in vague outline by West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's government in 1966, soon effloresced into a systematic, ambitious and positive policy. Instead of the old negative policies of the Konrad Adenauer era,¹⁰ the *Ostpolitik* paralleled the Lyndon Johnson administration's policies of "bridge-

⁹ Cf. V. V. Aspaturian, "Policy Perspectives in the Sixties," in A. Dallin and T. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), and "Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads," *International Organization*, Summer, 1969, pp. 589-620.

¹⁰ Designed largely to supplement the policies of "rollback" and "liberation" enunciated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of States, John Foster Dulles.

building." Instead of a head-on challenge to Soviet hegemony in East Europe, the new policies sought to exploit apparent Soviet weakness.

As the countries of East Europe displayed independence of Soviet control (and some demonstrated a positive response to the largely rhetorical flourishes of French President Charles de Gaulle's Eastern policy), the *Ostpolitik* emerged to capitalize on a concatenation of circumstances and conditions that seemed to augur success for a renewed German assertion of interest in East Europe. These conditions included the power and prestige of the United States, Bonn's chief ally; the growing economic power of West Germany; the muted defiance to Soviet control of East Europe; the looming threat on Moscow's eastern flank of China's growing nuclear power; the humiliation of Israel's victory over Moscow's Arab client states in the war of 1967; the apparent disintegration of the world Communist movement; and the overall appearance of malaise and economic failure in the Soviet Union, which projected an image of weakness.

From the vantage-point of Moscow, the *Ostpolitik* loomed as a new version of the traditional German *Drang nach Osten*, and in a certain sense it was precisely that. West Germany, the "economic giant and political dwarf," fashioned the *Ostpolitik* as her first exercise in converting economic power into political and diplomatic muscle.

The ultimate aim of the *Ostpolitik* was to create conditions in East Europe conducive to the reunification of Germany into a single state without resorting to violence or threatening the security and borders of the East European countries. Given West Germany's ambiguous attitude toward the territorial annexations by Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, such an aim was inherently contradictory, except that Bonn envisaged an agreement whereby unification between East and West Germany could be purchased in exchange for a firm guarantee of the territorial status quo in the area. To this end, Bonn offered not only economic inducements, which were powerful indeed, but also a

possible political and diplomatic counterpoise to Soviet power that might create conditions for greater freedom and autonomy.

Thus West Germany sought to establish direct political and economic contacts with the East European countries. At the same time, by informing and reassuring Moscow at each step, she thought that the Soviets would be dissuaded from using force to block German penetration. In the German view, in time, German penetration would gradually undermine and erode Soviet influence, as the East European countries gradually reoriented their economies to the more complementary West German economy while isolating East Germany. Since the East European states would cooperate in West Germany's expanding activity, the Soviet Union could block the West German challenge only by employing overt military force. But it was thought that the Soviets would be unwilling or incapable of resorting to force in the face of peaceful, nonviolent challenge. The basic miscalculation, as Brezhnev himself perceptively noted, was that the Soviet Union would stand by idly while its East European dominoes fell in a German game of solitaire.

As a consequence of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the old *Ostpolitik* is dead, as are the old United States policies of "bridge-building." In their place, as a result of the victory of the Social Democrats in the elections of 1969, a new controversial *Ostpolitik*, fashioned by Chancellor Willy Brandt, has emerged which, while acceptable to Moscow, is largely unacceptable to the Christian Democrats. The new *Ostpolitik* does not
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"However it may be assessed [in the Middle East], the Soviet Union has obviously acquired a semi-empire of a new kind, established in the name of anti-imperialism and national liberation, but a true sphere of influence in terms of the dominance of a great power and the dependence of weaker ones." This author concludes that "The existence of this Soviet sphere of influence is a signal fact of the present scene."

The Soviet Interest in the Middle East

BY ROBERT G. WESSON

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IF SOVIET-DOMINATED areas are shown in red on a map of the world, a large part of the Arab world, from Algeria to Iraq and South Yemen, must be marked with varying shades of pink. In recent years, half a dozen states have become military and political clients of the Soviet Union, which has staked itself out a huge, strategically and economically important sphere of influence.

This is a mighty achievement. Within fresh memory, the Middle East was practically a preserve of the Western powers, Britain, France and, secondarily, the United States. In 15 years, without participating in any war, the Russians have replaced Western power in the "progressive" Arab states. Profiting from the fact that the Arabs have had no experience of Russian imperialism, Soviet power has spread over the region with a minimum of friction and largely by invitation of the Arabs themselves, who are happy to receive largesse and support at what has thus far seemed a small price.

The great surge of Soviet influence has come since the June War of 1967, to the outbreak of which Soviet intrigue contributed. Although the shattering defeat of the Arabs was viewed at the time as a humiliation for Soviet arms, it blew the gates wide open to Soviet penetration by turning the Arabs against the West, particularly the United States, and making them dependent

on Soviet assistance for hopes of recovery. But the recent tide of Soviet influence in the Middle East is the culmination of a long and consistent policy. Shortly after the death of Joseph Stalin, who showed little interest in the ex-colonial world and regarded its independence as a sham, the Soviet government began looking outward and southward.

The breakthrough came in 1955. The United States-sponsored Baghdad Pact, designed as an anti-Communist barrier along the southern flank of the Soviet Union, seemed to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to be hostile to his aspirations for Arab leadership. The United States also refused to sell arms to Egypt, with a confidence that now seems naive that the Russians would not provide military aid to a non-Communist power. Nasser obtained his arms from the Soviet bloc, formally from Czechoslovakia, because of the Russians' initial reluctance openly to show their hand. The Western reaction of shock was thoroughly justified by the sequel. Trade agreements, cultural exchanges and high level visits followed, and Soviet advisers and other personnel were posted to Egypt in growing numbers.

The Suez crisis, in which the Soviet Union presented itself as champion and savior of the Arab peoples, gave a tremendous impetus to the Soviet drive. Syria followed Egypt into close relations with the Soviet Union, as did Iraq after the overthrow of the pro-West

Iraqi government in the summer of 1958, although she did not promptly become a Soviet satellite, as many hoped or feared. Intervention in Lebanon had on balance a negative effect on United States influence in the region. In December, 1958, the Soviet Union formally undertook Egypt's grand national project, the Aswan Dam, thereby gaining a major credit not only with the Egyptians but with many others in the underdeveloped world. Despite this, there was a little hiatus in relations in 1958-1959, as Nasser denounced and jailed Egyptian Communists and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev mildly reproved him for it. But since 1960 (in the beginning of which year Aswan construction began), the course of Soviet influence has been upward. More and more bonds have come to tie not only Egypt (the U.A.R.), but Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Sudan, recently Libya and, to some extent, Algeria, Yemen, and perhaps Lebanon, to the Soviet bloc.

RUSSIA'S HISTORIC AMBITION

This is an achievement of which Stalin's successors may be justly proud. In dickering with the Nazis concerning the Soviet Union's prospective adherence to the Axis, Vyacheslav Molotov demanded a Soviet sphere "south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf," which Adolph Hitler was entirely willing to concede, and control of the Straits, which cut sharply across Nazi aspirations and which Hitler completely ruled out. Soviet interest in this area was the largest cause of friction between the two powers during their uneasy partnership after August, 1939.

As soon as the war was over, Soviet diplomacy returned to the same theme. Molotov repeatedly demanded a share of the Italian colonies in North Africa, Libya, Tripoli, or Eritrea, plus a base in the Dodecanese Islands, along with revision of the Montreux Convention* governing use of the Straits. The Soviet government called energetically

for control (formally, joint control with Turkey) of the outlet to the Mediterranean and raised a claim to a portion of eastern Turkey, the Kars and Ardahan provinces which had once been held by the czarist empire, and also to some areas which had never been Russian-controlled. The Western powers regarded the prospect of Soviet power in the Mediterranean with extreme distaste; and Soviet pressure on Turkey, along with the Greek civil war, evoked the Truman Doctrine and a major shift of United States foreign policy. Stalin also tried to use the wartime presence of Soviet troops in Iran to slice off a section of that country and bowed out only to a near-ultimatum from the United States.

Such keen interest in expansion southward and into the Mediterranean was remarkable for a power bled and devastated, already territorially expanded (in East Europe and to some extent in the Far East) and lacking naval power. It was also a remarkable reversal of the earlier position of the Leninist Soviet state, which had vigorously denounced and renounced for itself such czarist hegemonic drives.

The traditional Russian ambition toward the Straits and the warm seas was evidently too embedded in the national purpose to be shaken even by a traumatic social revolution. It is not easy to explain the intensity of this traditional Russian interest. To some extent, it has been simply part of the growth of the Russian empire. It might also be seen as a continuing conflict with Muslim peoples as old as the Russian state. This grew up and solidified in contests with Muslim Tatars, and most of Russia's expansion, to east and south, has been at the expense of Muslim, largely Turkic, peoples. There were a dozen wars between Russia and Turkey between 1672 and 1914, and it seemed almost a Russian obsession to reverse the Turkish capture of the Byzantine empire.

An element of ideological determination, or messianism as it used to be called, entered into this ambition. There was no good commercial or strategic reasons for Russia to reach for the Straits during this period; attainment would not have offered defensible

* *Ed. note:* The Montreux Convention, signed on July 20, 1936, gave Turkey full control over the Straits area, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

boundaries but rather would have added to the burdens of imperial defense. But to control the holy lands of Orthodoxy, to recover for czar-led Christendom the Second Rome, would have been a vindication of Holy Russia, the Third Rome.

The old czarist expansionist urge has clearly continued to feed the Soviet drive into the Middle East, the only direction in which Soviet expansion is feasible. There is nothing to be achieved by the Soviet Union in the Far East, short of war with China; Western Europe is relatively strong, and ventures there, since the occupation of Czechoslovakia, would be very hazardous. Khrushchev's efforts to influence the Third World far afield, as in Ghana and the Congo, proved unremunerative. But the Middle East, where political and economic policies can be pressed under the shadow of Soviet military power, beckons most invitingly.

The junction of Europe, Africa and Asia, it is as strategic as any area in the world. Even control of the Suez Canal in reliably friendly, if not actually Soviet, hands would be a prize. The Soviet press, exulting in naval strength, has made it clear that any Western presence in the eastern Mediterranean is regarded as illegitimate, even as the Soviet navy makes itself at home there and reaches into the Indian ocean. Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean has been fitfully expanded until it is comparable to United States power and is backed by several shore bases; Soviet inferiority in aircraft carriers is compensated in part by air bases. This naval buildup may be considered compensation for the setback of the Cuban crisis of 1962, after which the buildup began.

MILITARY PRESSURES

Soviet progress has been very largely based on military power, despite the outwardly non-military character of Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet mission of spreading proletarian socialism or "world revolutionary transformation." Economic strategy has been secondary; when the Soviet Union has acquired a stake in the economies of its Arab clients, this has usually been achieved by

arms deliveries, generously proffered and gratefully received. There is no better key to influence in an area where military leaders hold political sway. With weapons go advisers; furnishing equipment in larger quantities and of more sophistication than the recipient can handle increases dependence. The relationship is not easy to break. Officers are trained to Soviet military ways; parts must be procured from the original purveyors; and turning to Western sources would require a sacrifice either of firepower or money. Understandably, the Soviet Union has shown little interest in an arms embargo for the Middle East.

In the Soviet view, however, the Soviet interest in the Middle East is purely idealistic, rising out of a passion for justice and opposition to capitalist-supported imperialism, of which Israel is regarded as an extension. This may be dismissed as a pose, if one will; the Soviets never admit to pursuing any national political interest. But it is more realistic to recognize that the Soviet leadership probably regards itself as forwarding the Marxist-Leninist cause, and that Communist visions may occupy its thoughts as much as the czars were charmed with hopes of championing Orthodoxy or seeing their banner wave over the old "Czargrad," the imperial city of Constantine.

The primary Soviet ideological purpose in the Middle East seems to be to merge Arab nationalism into anti-Westernism and anticapitalism and, as far as possible, to merge the call for Arab unity into the unity of the "world Communist movement." The Arab struggle against Israel is "an integral part of the general struggle of the forces of freedom and socialism against international imperialism," according to the official declaration of the world conference of Communist parties in Moscow in June, 1969.

Arab leaders find it easy to accept this view, according to which they have been humiliated not by tiny Israel but by American capitalism. Just as Nasser claimed in the June War that United States aircraft had intervened in the fighting, he emphasizes and wildly exaggerates the presence of Americans

in the Israeli forces and the support received by Israel from the United States. Equating the anti-Zionist cause with the global cause of communism and subsuming his struggle in the grand Soviet-American contest save Nasser's self-respect and offer an assurance of ultimate victory.

But the Soviet leaders are interested not only in the foreign policy of their clients. They have some confidence that the closer a country follows the Soviet model in social, economic and political organization, the more trustworthy its allegiance. Working with and securing a dominant influence over various less developed countries represent an opportunity for the Soviets to mold their development. Soviet policy is also pragmatic. In its revolutionary heyday, Soviet Russia was ready to embrace as a partner Turkish President Kemal Ataturk, a non-Communist leader who needed Soviet support much as Nasser needs it now. Even if Arab leaders are not properly devoted to "scientific socialism" and even if they repress Communist parties, this is not decisive.

The Soviet government has long directed its foreign aid toward strengthening the public sector in the economy of countries of the Third World. It has also encouraged moves toward socialism, particularly but not only those directed against Western interests. The Soviets cheered when Nasser largely nationalized the Egyptian economy in 1961 and limited land tenure; they approved less extensive nationalizations in Syria and Iraq. How far such measures may have been taken at Soviet prompting one can only guess. After the June War, the Soviets openly pushed Nasser in the direction of social revolution, urging a purge of "bourgeois" officers in the army and an attack on private wealth in general; they ridiculed the theory that the national struggle created a community of interest of landlords and merchants with peasants and workers. Identifying his cause with that of the Soviet Union, Nasser has good reason to accept the collaboration of Communists and near-Communists and to favor those who are enthusiastic about co-operation with the Soviet Union.

From the Soviet point of view, the chief missing ingredient for Soviet-style authoritarianism is an elite party; a Leninist party is not necessary for seizing power but for using it. Nasser's Arab Socialist Union falls far short of the Soviet type of ruling party, but there have been moves to tighten it. In Syria and other Arab countries, it seems to be hoped that a semi-legal Communist party or sector can prod from outside or direct from inside the government until perhaps one absorbs the other and political institutions are as much like those of the Soviet Union as necessary.

Lenin, however, saw greater utility in sponsoring colonial revolutions than the pleasure of seeing them adopt Soviet-socialist ways. He hoped to undercut the capitalist order in the industrial countries, which, according to his interpretation, were able to avert revolution by their workers through the exploitation of the workers in the colonial countries. Because the most notoriously profitable of "capitalist monopolies" are the oil companies, Soviet control of the world's most important fuel supplies, although it would hardly cripple the American economy, would be a high trump, especially in Soviet relations with West Europe. This is a rather distant hope, as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait remain well removed from the Soviet embrace; but it cannot be forgotten that radical officers might carry out a coup anywhere in the Arab world, as they recently did in Libya.

The Soviets are also interested in oil for themselves or their friends. Large new reserves have been reported in Siberia, but the very fact that the Russians are working on fields so difficult of access and costly to develop is an indication of the desirability of cheap and easily accessible Middle Eastern resources. Supplying East Europe seems to be increasingly difficult, and satellite countries have been encouraged to look to Iran and elsewhere. It is significant that in 1946 the Soviet price for evacuating Iranian Azerbaijan was a petroleum concession (ratification of which was refused by the Iranian government after Soviet forces had been withdrawn). Recently, the Soviet

Union has been entering the oil business in Iraq, and reportedly may do so in Libya.

THE JEWISH QUESTION

Soviet attitudes in the Middle East are further complicated by the Jewish question. Jews within the Soviet Union are suspect and subject to discrimination, at least in religious and cultural matters, not only because of traditional anti-Semitism but because they have an external focus of loyalty. Israel is hated because of her spiritual and to some extent her political attraction for the millions of Soviet Jews. The Soviet Union in 1948 demonstratively recognized the new Jewish state; instead of seeing the possibilities in the conservative Arab world of that day, the Soviets apparently hoped that Israel might become a vehicle of Soviet policy. But when Golda Meir arrived in Moscow as first Israeli ambassador in July, 1948, she was received with a shockingly spontaneous, massive outburst of enthusiasm, such as the Soviet capital had not witnessed for decades. Stalin, who appreciated enthusiasm only for himself, took grave umbrage. The Soviet press began denouncing Zionism, and repression of Jewish institutions was intensified. The Israeli government advocated the right of emigration for Soviet Jews, an unacceptable idea for a state whose control over its citizens requires that they be denied freedom to leave it; the Soviet government came to view Israel as a United States outpost several years before there were any moves to court the Arabs. Stalin went as far as to break diplomatic relations in February, 1953. He was then preparing a purge in connection with an alleged plot for political murder by Jewish doctors in league with Zionist and United States intelligence organizations.

Stalin's successors restored relations not long after his death. But increasingly they supported the Arabs in their conflict with Israel, until in 1955 they adopted the full-scale pro-Arab policy which has continued to this day. Anti-Semitism became less brutal than it had been under Stalin but, unlike other national groups in the Soviet

Union, the Jews are still denied a national identity. Judaism is permitted less scope than any other recognized religion and is subjected to more abuse. Jews continue to annoy the Soviet government by seeking permission to go to Israel, and Soviet leaders seem to regard Israel as fundamentally inimical, supported by American capital at least partly for anti-Soviet purposes.

This feeling and the desire to discredit Israel and, as far as possible, neutralize her must have been much increased by the outcome of the June War, which was a defeat for Soviet arms and Soviet-advised armies. The ferocity of propaganda against Israel since then may incline one to wonder how much more could be said if Israel and the Soviet Union were actually at war: Israel is defamed as a front for capitalist imperialism and vilified as neo-Nazi. The relationship between Soviet Middle Eastern policy and the Jewish question within the Soviet Union was demonstrated in March, 1970. An intensification of arms deliveries to Egypt was backed by an anti-Israel campaign in which many Soviet Jews were asked to declare publicly their loyalty to the "Socialist Fatherland" and to denounce the Israeli aggressors.

THE MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY

The Soviet anti-Jewish or anti-Zionist stance pleases the Arabs and helps to convince them that the Soviets are their sincere friends. Likewise, the pro-Arab policy doubtless satisfies a large part of Soviet citizenry; there are some 30 million Muslims in the Soviet Union. The Russian-dominated Soviet leadership may feel some need to heed its Muslim constituency, as this undoubtedly represents a severe problem. Ever since the revolution, the Soviet rulers have been striving to bring the Muslims, especially those of Central Asia, into the common Soviet mold. The Soviet Union cut what were formerly close cultural contacts with the Muslim communities to the south, changed the script from Arabic to Cyrillic, and partly Russified the languages of Central Asia. They have fought continually against

what they regard as backward social and religious customs. Yet the swarthy Asian peoples have proved very resistant to Sovietization.

The Muslim peoples reached by German armies in World War II, the Crimean Tatars and several small nationalities of the Caucasus, were so anti-Soviet that Stalin shipped them off en masse at great cost in lives. The Crimean Tatars have never been permitted to return to their homeland. It was probably with good reason that the Soviets made little use of Muslims as combat soldiers during the war.

The Central Asian republics remain relatively backward to this day, despite the Soviet propaganda pretense of uplifting the peoples. They are less industrialized than the rest of the country; the industry which they have is largely manned by Slavic immigrants and is mostly less favored light industry. Hardly any Central Asians are counted as sufficiently devoted to the Soviet order to merit high places in politically important institutions, as on the Central Committee or in the upper ranks of the army. Russians notoriously despise their Central Asian brother peoples as backward and dirty, as some Russians are reported to look down upon Arabs with whom they work in Egypt. The per capita income of Central Asian peoples, which is probably less than half the Soviet average, has been falling further behind in recent years. Tensions have apparently been rising. Soviet authorities have seemingly made little or no progress in the last decade against the old customs, particularly against early marriage and the seclusion of women, who, in the Soviet scheme, should join the labor force. Even covert polygamy remains common. Islam, which is a mark of national, non-Soviet identity as well as a religion, has recovered strength after decades of persecution.

The fact that the Soviet Union is in part a Muslim power tends to place it on the Arab side of the Middle Eastern conflict. It is also significant for the Soviet government that the Muslims, like the Jews, have powerful bonds with foreign powers. If Soviet

influence could be extended over much of the Muslim world abroad, especially over the principal centers of Islamic culture, the anti-Soviet potential of Islam would be mitigated. It would be especially helpful for the integration of the Muslims into the Soviet mold if Egypt could be brought firmly into the Soviet sphere. Egypt is important because of its recognized cultural and theological institutions, like Al Azhar University in Cairo, at which a few Soviet Muslims have been permitted to study since 1955.

For these several reasons, the Soviet Union regards the Middle East as a region of prime concern and seems inclined to play a strong hand in its promisingly fluid politics. There are, however, weighty reasons that make Soviet leaders hesitant to push forward rapidly or to assert their power blatantly. One is the risk involved. The Soviets seem well aware that the United States would be prepared to go far to prevent either the destruction of Israel, or Soviet control of the oil resources of the Middle East. A new Arab-Israeli war would be dangerous, threatening either the overthrow of friends of the Soviet Union in Damascus and Cairo or United States intervention.

The Soviets, desirous of a reputation as lovers of peace, consequently speak reasonably from time to time, acknowledge the right of Israel to exist, and enter negotiations to reduce or control tensions even while cheering the Arab side and furnishing more arms. Despite pressure from the Chinese who are outflanking them on the left, they have likewise been wary of taking up the cause of the foremost activists on the Arab side, the Palestinian guerrillas. They are doing very well under present circumstances, and they are confident that their position is gradually becoming more and more solidified. Soviet training comes to be taken for granted; Western cultural influences fade and are to some extent replaced by Russian; dependence on the Soviet Union becomes an accepted fact.

Material costs must also give pause to the Soviet protectors of Arab states. They have expended the equivalent of several billion

dollars in economic and military aid to Egypt without bringing much economic growth or military strength. Like United States dispensers of aid, Soviet officials probably have come to see their Arab friends as a bottomless sink into which scarce Soviet resources may be poured endlessly. Experience with Cuba, a drain of about a billion dollars daily, must also deter the Soviets from any inclination to try to convert Arab countries into full-scale satellites, members of the "Socialist Commonwealth." By inference, Soviet interest in the oil-rich lands may be expected to be more profound.

An inclination to push fast or hard toward domination in the Middle East is also undoubtedly tempered by the urge to spread Soviet influence farther. As long as cooperation with the Soviet Union appears to lead to satellithood and Soviet-directed social change, the more conservative Arab states will be wary of permitting the camel's nose in the tent. But if Soviet aid seems selfless and unconditional, even semi-feudal, oil-rich Arab rulers may be persuaded to overcome their repugnance and join the pro-Soviet company. This is only slightly less true of 100 other countries of the underdeveloped world. What happens to national independence where Soviet influence is strongest is crucial for the Soviet image, and the Soviets are careful of appearances. More concretely, Cairo is currently useful as a pro-Soviet center, a focal point for leftist or anti-Western organizations and activities and a funnel for arms and other support; this utility would be much diminished if the Egyptian government patently ceased to be a free agent. The Middle Eastern crossroads is strategically important not for nuclear conflict but for the penetration of the Third World. One may speculate that if the Soviets give up hope of further expansion, they may decide to nail down control of what they can.

KEEPING THE STATUS QUO

In sum, it seems to be in the Soviet interest in the Middle East to maintain the status quo, to use the Arab-Israeli conflict to secure a permanent position, and to enlarge and

strengthen that position without major risks or great costs. This involves the rather delicate task of managing tensions and keeping the Arabs tolerably satisfied without giving them enough strength to secure their aims. The present Soviet leaders have shown themselves conservative on the domestic scene to the point of immobility, and they have nowhere showed an inclination to gamble.

Caution does not always suffice, however, to avoid complications. Aside from the notorious unpredictability of events in the Middle East, the Soviets may well find themselves more deeply involved than they anticipated. Through over-optimism or an ideologically shaded view they may be dangerously misled. Although he was basically cautious in foreign relations, Stalin was thus several times engaged in risky operations, as in the 1939-1940 war against Finland, which was foreseen as an easy little campaign but which nearly brought the Soviet Union to disaster. Historically, on the whole Russia has been cautious in designs; but she has been involved in her full share of wars. The Leonid Brezhnev-Aleksei Kosygin leadership has thus far seemed prudent in its dealings with the world, but Czechoslovakia showed that the leadership is capable of unpredictable actions.

The Soviet Union might easily become entangled beyond initial intentions, somewhat as the United States has been in Vietnam. Even caution could dictate deeper involvement, if it is reasoned that more Soviet forces on the ground would restrain Arab rashness. The Soviets have invested heavily, both in money and in prestige, in their Arab dependents; if at any time this investment seems endangered, the reaction will probably be to increase it. The Soviets are likely to take measures more extreme than they would otherwise contemplate to prevent potential loss, which is the less admissible because of the ideological image of the world movement's irresistible forward march. If a pro-Soviet government were threatened by insurrection, it might be difficult for the Soviets to stand aside. They may be driven, almost willy-nilly, to communize because their only reliable friends are the Communists and they

have confidence in no economic or political structure different from their own. In the same way, Stalin may not have initially contemplated sovietizing Poland or Rumania, but he wanted governments completely loyal and cooperative; these could only be Stalinist-Communist regimes. There is no demarcation between friends, clients and satellites, and for the Soviets only movement in their direction is admissible.

How Soviet policy in the Middle East develops depends in large part on the unpredictable evolution of the Soviet political system itself. Its long-term stability cannot be taken for granted, and there have recently been indications of a serious loss of dynamism. This is to be expected of a regime which has no means, constitutional or otherwise, of refreshing its leadership. But if troubles increase in the economy, in the discontent of intellectuals or in the restiveness of the minorities who comprise half the population, this does not promise relaxation abroad.

Insecurity rather breeds truculence; the system in difficulty and the decadent regime might well strive to divert attention and to vindicate itself by foreign victories, to evidence the invincible tide of the movement. This might be done more or less unconsciously, as oligarchs see themselves securing better morale and fuller support by pushing the cause in the world outside. It might be done with full awareness, as the Romanov regime persuaded itself in 1904 that new territories and some easy triumphs over the Japanese would help to stabilize the monarchy. Something like this may already be occurring. Soviet policies may be influenced by the fact that, with disappointing results in industry and agriculture, the Middle East is the only area where the Soviet-Communist movement can chalk up major successes. It may not be accidental that the March, 1970, anti-Zionist polemics and the stepping up of the Soviet commitment to the Arab states coincided with a campaign of labor discipline and increased productivity after a pessimistic economic report. Cautious people in trouble have taken many risky steps.

In the long view, it seems clear that the

Soviet Union is working toward the realization of a time-honored Russian dream, a vast sphere of influence or control over the whole area to the south, from India, where the Soviet position is already very strong, through Iran, Turkey and the Arab Near East and North Africa. How far control may go is conjectural, but there is no reason in their political philosophy why the Russians should be satisfied with much less control in the territories to the south of their homeland than in those to the west. To build up this hegemonic domain properly, of course, Turkey and Iran must enter the Soviet order.

A grave deterrent to much fuller assertion of Soviet power in the Arab world at present is the fact that forces there can be supplied only by a very long detour from the Baltic, or through Turkish-controlled waters, or through Greek, Turkish or Iranian airspace; in a crisis forces there might conceivably be deprived of support. Hence, highest Soviet priority probably goes to securing closer relations with, and ultimately influence over, the two nations of most strategic significance for Soviet expansion, Turkey and Iran. Russia pressed directly against these nations in czarist times and Stalin raised his claims against them also. In dealing with them, however, the Soviet Union lacks the fortuitous advantages which have facilitated its penetration of the Arab world. They are not driven to desperation by conflict with Israel; they are not infuriated with the West, but still look to the United States for protection. They have a tolerably sound economic basis, are well integrated, and have fairly stable governments. They have had ample experience with Russian imperialism. Thus they were resistant to Soviet intimidation and subversion under Stalin.

At present, despite assiduous courting, their relations with the Soviet Union remain only

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"Is the Soviet Union moving towards its own upheaval . . . ?" asks this specialist. He concludes that "adding up all the protests, the actively disgruntled elements, organized or not, are still preciously few and are not themselves a major problem for the vast organization of the party and the secret police. But added to other problems which might make the dissent mushroom as it did in East Europe, the issue cannot be ignored."

Dissent and Stability in the Soviet Union

BY DAVID T. CATTELL

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ANOTHER CAMPAIGN for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. came to an end on June 14, 1970, and 99.96 of the registered voters were organized to cast their ballots for the 1,517 candidates for the 1,517 seats in the two houses of the Supreme Soviet. The candidates, the agitators and all the members of the Communist party were busy several weeks before the election, campaigning and propagandizing the population to support the government and renew their pledge and commitment to the leadership of the Communist party and its chosen leaders.

There was nothing to distinguish this campaign from any other. The masses, perhaps slightly less enthusiastic than before, were as docile as ever and marched to the polls in a holiday atmosphere. There was not the slightest hint of an opposition. Nevertheless, since the last election to the Supreme Soviet four years ago, there has been a stream of reports coming to the West about a growing opposition to the present regime. The ferment reported by these underground sources seems to contradict the picture of serenity represented by the unanimous, unopposed elections to the Supreme Soviet. Which of these pictures is correct? Is the Soviet Union moving towards its own upheaval, following the road taken by Poland and Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in

1967-1968? How does the Soviet leadership see these developments?

If it is true that the opposition and its demands for change are expanding significantly, the danger to the regime is clear. Over the last two decades, the scenario has already been played several times both in the East and the West. Unrest begins among the young urban intellectuals who become alienated from the system. In Poland, opposition began during 1955 (see for example the famous "Poem for Adults"). In Hungary, it organized around the Petofi Circle in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia the dissatisfaction of the intellectuals broke out at the Writers Congress in the summer of 1967. In the West, there was student unrest in Latin America, Japan, France, the United States and Germany. The second stage is marked by the spread of alienation and the demands for reforms among the established intellectuals working within the system, often in high places. The third and crucial stage, as was shown in Hungary and Czechoslovakia where the scenarios were played out to their tragic end, is an alliance between the intellectuals and the workers. Then protest becomes a real revolutionary movement, and massive force is required to suppress it.

The Soviet leaders can recognize this scenario from their own study of the Russian revolution and recent revolutionary attempts

in East Europe. But publicly they deny that any danger exists for the Soviet Union and they speak with pride about the superiority of the Communist system, in which students and intellectuals have no desire to protest. (See, for example, Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's speech to the Komsomol Congress on May 26, 1970.) Are they being merely deceitful, or are they blind to the rising dissent? Essentially they are neither.

FEAR OF DISSENT

A survey of the reports of protests in the Soviet Union indicates clearly that the number of dissenters there are so few and scattered that their impact is infinitesimal and is barely known (if it is known at all) to a large part of the population. But while publicly Soviet leaders can honestly deny the existence of anything that resembles the dissent in the West, the leadership is nevertheless apprehensive, almost intimidated, by the handful in opposition. The reasons are several and involve the delicate balance of the post-Stalin, post-totalitarian system of government which has developed in the U.S.S.R. over the last two decades. First of all, the Soviet leadership is afraid that its system cannot tolerate and cannot absorb even a limited amount of dissent among students and intellectuals. Having controlled mass responses for many years, it cannot foresee the free response of the workers and the majority of students to protest and to demands for reform. The experiences of East Europe point up the danger.

Another reason for increased concern is that within the last two years dissent, as small as it is, has nevertheless spread into several sectors of society. There have been a growing number of protests among non-Russian nationalities, especially the Crimea Tatars still unable to return to their homelands after World War II, the Ukrainians, the Jews and the Baltic peoples. An increasing number of writers have tried to express their national feelings, only to be arrested. Their trials, even when held in secret, become known and provide the basis for further protests.

Perhaps more alarming, dissent has penetrated into the "establishment" sectors of the system. For example, there are rumors that dissent has penetrated a small group of military officers in the Baltic fleet. More widespread and thoroughly documented have been the demands for reforms by leading academics, including members of the prestigious Academy of Sciences. The most famous of these are the nuclear physicists, Pyotr L. Kapitsa and Andrei D. Sakharov, and the biologist, Zhores A. Medvedev. Professor Sakharov wrote an essay distributed widely among intellectuals titled "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," in which he argued that collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States is essential for the solution of the world's ills. Because of their prestige and their value to the regime (Sakharov contributed to the building of the Soviet hydrogen bomb), it is difficult to silence these men. Even more important, a growing number of intellectuals are publicly signing petitions protesting the prosecution of dissenters. Over 125 Ukrainian intellectuals petitioned against the secret trials of 15 or more Ukrainian writers in 1966. At least 40 prominent Soviet intellectuals have protested the detention for psychiatric observation of the biologist, Zhores A. Medvedev, because he urged more international cooperation among scientists.

There is also evidence that the isolated dissenters are beginning to communicate with one another and to organize. The British Broadcasting Corporation, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and other foreign broadcasts beam back for general dissemination the protests and underground petitions that are smuggled out of the U.S.-S.R. Within the U.S.S.R. itself, the channels for distributing all kinds of underground materials have become widespread. For example, there is an underground monthly, *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (*Chronicle of Current Events*) which has been published for almost two years. It reports the various protest events and activities extensively and without editorial comment. From the nature of the publication, it is likely that it originates

and is distributed through the extensive scientific community.

It is not merely the growing numbers and organization but the tenacity of the dissenters which is alarming. In spite of threats, arrests and imprisonment, the hard-core dissenters continue to defy the system openly by signing petitions and marching in the streets. Another factor which makes the present dissenters dangerous is that (except for very few) they do not call for an overthrow of the regime but protest its failure to follow its own constitution and laws, its failure to conduct fair trials, and its denial of free discussion. Rarely do the dissenters attack the theoretical basis of the system.

Finally, the underground press or *Samizdat*, as it is called in the Soviet Union, has become popular among the youth because it represents adventure and the defiance of authority. Participation in underground press activity seems to be so widespread that without initiating a reign of terror the regime cannot stop it. The very laxness of the regime in trying to suppress it only seems to encourage it more. Even youths not at odds with the system enjoy the game.

Adding up all the protests, the actively disgruntled elements, organized or not, are still preciously few and are not themselves a major problem for the vast organization of the party and the secret police. But added to other problems which might make dissent mushroom as it did in East Europe, the issue cannot be ignored. The original promises of the economic reforms of 1965-1967 have proved disappointing, and industrial growth has fallen from a 10 per cent increase per year in 1967 to 7 per cent in 1969. Since the chief criterion of success in the Soviet system has been industrial growth, its decline puts the leadership in some jeopardy. Although it is still a respectable growth rate, it is comparable to that of several Western countries and thus postpones the goal of surpassing capitalism even longer. At the same time, the demands on the system for defense, consumer goods, aid to East Europe and aid to North Vietnam and the Arab countries continue to expand.

Equally disturbing has been the gradual decline of labor discipline and popular enthusiasm since the Stalinist era. The revolutionary, patriotic zeal of the masses, on which Stalin relied heavily to overcome deficiencies in planning and performance, no longer exists. Instead, there is continuous grumbling about the still inadequate quality and the shortage of consumer goods. In 1969, certain foods such as meat were in shorter supply than in previous years. In fact, the dullness and the boredom of Soviet life weigh on the population. Alcoholism and absenteeism are rampant, in spite of increasing restrictions and punishments.

AN AGING BUREAUCRACY

To face these problems, Brezhnev and Kosygin must mobilize an aging bureaucracy, jealous, conservative and insistent on preserving its prerogatives. Moreover, among the top bureaucrats there are some who maneuver in the wings, only too anxious to make Brezhnev, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and their lieutenants scapegoats in order to take over. Although this type of chicanery has always been typical of the system, what makes it particularly difficult for Brezhnev and Kosygin is that they have never wielded the power of absolute leaders and cannot liquidate their rivals. Their hold on the number one and number two positions in the government has been maintained at the sufferance of the several power cliques in the elite, and these groups continue to be able to exercise a veto over policy.

Under Khrushchev, the bureaucracy proved itself incapable of accepting anything but minor changes. It docilely acknowledged the form of his new programs but absorbed none of the substance. Today, more openly than ever, a large number in the bureaucracy, particularly in the cultural and ideological sections, are not just conservative but reactionary, and almost openly pro-Stalinist. Against these forces, how can Brezhnev and Kosygin meet the crisis except by giving in to Stalinism? Judging by their recent speeches and decrees calling for increased ideological indoctrination and for

greater labor discipline, they appear to be using the traditional solutions. But these recent slogans are deceptive. Looking over the last five years, the leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin reveals a balanced, if cautious, program of reform, as well as repression.

Beginning with the negative policies of controlling dissent, Khrushchev's successors, at first, tried to play the pro-Stalinist, reactionary intellectual groups off against the liberal elements in order to achieve some balance. They found the liberal criticism useful in their fight against bureaucratism and arbitrary leadership. But since the shock of the Czech crisis they have gradually reversed their stand and, particularly since the fall of 1969, they have been removing liberals from important editorial positions or isolating them. For example, in February, 1970, five dogmatists and party hacks were added to the editorial board of *Novi mir*, a literary periodical long in the forefront of promoting greater artistic freedom. The fear of increasing dissent, the pressure of the conservative bureaucracy, the economic problems, and the Czech crisis and its aftermath seem to have brought about a policy of repression on all fronts in the Soviet Union and in the nations of East Europe.

Outright dissenters in the U.S.S.R. and in the bloc are being fired from their jobs and their earning power is being completely cut off or reduced to a minimum, making them dependent on friends and relatives. No Soviet press will publish any of their works or report even unfavorably on their protests. If the dissenters have been prominent, they are discredited by attacks from their peers. Thus the author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, was denounced repeatedly in the Union of Writers. Or they are accused of treason because they have allowed their works or petitions to be published in the West. (There is some suspicion that the secret police may help smuggle out works of discredited authors in order to provide the grounds for denunciations.) In some cases, legal repression is used but in others (in order to avoid publicity or court trials) dissenters may be committed to psychiatric institutions. These

harsh tactics have successfully reduced dissenters to a very few. For example, in Czechoslovakia, where the liberals were almost completely in control in the spring of 1968, they have now been reduced to absolute impotence. Thus even without a Stalinist reign of terror, the U.S.S.R. and the bloc have within a couple of years restored a monotonous, orthodox conformity to their society.

More important, however, are the positive policies of Brezhnev and Kosygin by means of which they hope to keep the bulk of the population and the elite out of the ranks of the opposition and loyal to the leadership. Indoctrination is still given a top priority in the curing of all ills, and the party continues to stress the need for more. But the leaders seem aware that much indoctrination falls on deaf ears. The party also still tries to arouse the population with fears of an external threat, particularly from the imperialists in the United States and more recently from the Communist renegades in China. Although the cry of "wolf" still has some impact, it is not enough to sustain continuous sacrifices. There are also disturbing signs that the leadership might again resort to scapegoats as a mobilizing technique. The scapegoats will not be kulaks or industrial wreckers as before, or the new dissenters who are too few and to whom the regime does not want to give publicity. Rather they are likely to be the old Czarist victims, the Jews. Anti-Semitic sentiments still have strong roots, and the target would fit into plans for Soviet penetration in the Middle East and Soviet support of the Arab cause. Thus far, the regime only seems to be flirting with the idea.

The main emphasis of Brezhnev and Kosygin's program for stability, however, is not on propaganda, scapegoats or suppression; rather, they stress the gradual raising of the standard of living of the population. They assume that the vast majority of the citizenry, young and old, are seeking primarily material ends. The Soviet masses have not yet been jaded or disillusioned by affluence and are only beginning to feel the social pressures and alienation of urbanization. The cur-

rent stability of Hungary is predicated on the same assumption, and Czech Communist party leader Gustav Husak is beginning a similar program in Czechoslovakia.

In the last 15 years, there has been a fundamental shift in the values and priorities of the Soviet system. Stalin saw the expanding economy primarily as a means of increasing the might of the Soviet bloc; he expected the population to be rewarded for its loyalty and hard work by the glory of the Soviet empire. In contrast, the post-Stalin leadership has committed itself to improved living conditions as a sign of Soviet success and as a more important reward for the masses. It has committed ever expanding resources to better food and improved housing and it cannot afford to fail in this. But consumer priority has added a major burden to the economy and, therefore, reform of the economic system has become paramount.

ECONOMIC REFORMS

Thus, while reimposing social and political orthodoxy on the one hand, Brezhnev and Kosygin are reforming the economy on the other. They are not merely juggling the apparatus, as all Soviet administrators have done, but in their cautious way they are moving toward some fundamental changes in the economic system. They see the key to continued economic development in the slow, careful experimenting in better organizational forms and increased economic efficiency. Although their gradual approach may have resulted from a reaction to the "harebrained schemes" of Khrushchev and a fear of upsetting the delicate power balance, it may also indicate an appreciation of the age and failings of the bureaucracy. It takes time to reeducate and to recruit younger top administrators who have not inherited the psychological insecurities and fears of the Stalinist system and who are willing to take risks. Nevertheless, there has been an important shift away from the single emphasis on output regardless of sacrifices or quality to more complex indices based on profits, economic efficiency and consumer satisfaction.

Although actual reforms have been slow and in some cases almost minute, the basic units of evaluation have been changed. They include: (1) a whole new pricing system, which although still bureaucratically fixed, is closer to the marginal value and scarcity of the product; (2) an increasing use of interest charges to take into account the contribution of capital to production; (3) realistic amortization schedules; (4) the establishing of a value for land to be included for accounting and costing purposes; (5) a shift in incentives to profit, completion and acceptability to the consumer, and so forth. The use of these new measures for calculating costs and plan fulfillment has set the fulfillment inefficiencies of the traditional methods of the economy into bold relief. Already in areas such as housing and city planning, the recalculations have had a major impact and have pointed up major areas of waste of resources. Efficiency calculations are useless, however, without the organizational forms to adjust and to take advantage of them.

ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

A major source of Communist pride beginning with Lenin has been communism's genius of organization. It was Lenin's small, disciplined elite corps of Bolsheviks which managed to seize power and fight a successful civil war against overwhelming odds. It was Stalin's success in using the Communist party, the secret police and state planning bodies to organize and mobilize the population which brought rapid industrialization and ultimately led to the victory of the U.S.S.R. in World War II. The post-Stalin leadership also looks to organization as the means to raise the Soviet Union to its final pinnacle of power and to stabilize the system.

Soviet leaders realize that the forms of organization will have to differ from those of Lenin and Stalin, except that they intend to have the Communist party remain as the primary control instrument even in this new metamorphosis. In experimenting, Khrushchev and now Brezhnev and Kosygin seem to be seeking the proper balance of two or-

ganizational principles, centralization versus decentralization, and exploring the role of discussion and advice in decision-making. The Soviet leaders have gradually come to realize that for effective central control in a complex society, widespread decentralization is necessary. In order to assure that the leadership will wield the main instruments of power, local and minor decisions must be invested in the local administrators.

However, for the decentralization process to be successful it must be systematic, that is, (1) it has to be logically and uniformly organized so that the central government can monitor the process and easily and quickly step in when problems develop and (2) the decision-making process at the local level must be rational and efficient. The incentives and skills at the local level must be such as to encourage intelligent decisions and some initiative. This experimenting in the balance of centralization-decentralization has been most widespread in all aspects of housing from its construction to its allocation and maintenance. Recently, management of industries producing for local consumption has also been adjusted to provide more decentralization.

Reliable information and expertise are other crucial factors in efficient decision-making. In a highly politicized society such as the Soviet Union, there is a tendency to resolve questions mainly by political criteria. By means of the "red triangle," Lenin sought to bring into the decision-making process the expertise of the pre-revolutionary managers and scientists. Decisions were made by the technical managers and scientists together with representatives of the party and trade union. This insured the political dominance and reliability of the decision but did not ignore the technical questions. Stalin, by training his own managers and scientists from the ranks of young Communists, sought to simplify the problem, but in the end his system proved wasteful and politics dominated everything.

The present regime seems to be seeking a solution by large-scale support of independent research free from Marxian dogma,

particularly in the various scientific academies, by allowing relatively free exchanges with scientists in the West, and by urging free discussion of technical and reform issues so long as they do not involve politics. Thus, while in the cultural fields debate and exchanges have been sharply curtailed, in the scientific and technical fields the debates have been intensive, with the party serving as the final arbitrator. The difficulty is that it is often not clear which are the technical questions to be discussed and which are the political decisions to be made by the party.

Furthermore, the free exchange which has grown out of these discussions in the scientific community has created unfortunate side effects for the regime: the scientists have tended to turn their critical faculties toward the political arena and to use their prestigious positions to protect themselves from retaliation by the regime. In addition, their contacts abroad have allowed them to exchange political and social ideas with Western intellectuals. Although the leadership seems to have been willing to tolerate the side effects up to a point in order to encourage rational decisions in the economy and in the field of social planning, the Soviet leaders now seem to be trying to discourage such side effects by punishing one of the leaders of the exchange movement, the biologist, Medvedev.

Thus far, this test case has proved to be unfortunate. Apparently the regime did not anticipate that Medvedev would receive overwhelming support from his colleagues. In the end, the regime may be forced into a standoff. The outcome of this contest may have important consequences.

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Analyzing recent developments in Soviet agriculture, this economist observes that the present Soviet government "... has undertaken a number of reforms designed to alleviate some of the chronic problems of the agricultural sector and to correct some of the more blatant policy mistakes of its predecessors."

Prospects for Soviet Agriculture

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THE PROBLEM of achieving and maintaining high levels of marketed agricultural produce is one of the major themes running through Soviet economic history from the early post-Revolutionary period to the present. Agricultural problems have plagued every Soviet political leader from V. I. Lenin to First Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Leonid Brezhnev and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin. The Soviet leadership faces a new decade in which the pressure for higher living standards will undoubtedly place new demands on the agricultural sector for necessary increases in marketed agricultural produce to provide a growing urban population with an improved diet. The current problems facing Soviet agriculture, however, did not arise with the change of leadership in 1964, and should be set in perspective.

Soviet agricultural performance is determined in large part by natural parameters, which are independent of ideology and political and institutional relationships. These natural parameters, moreover, are often overlooked in the evaluation of Soviet agricul-

tural performance.¹ Since the great bulk of the U.S.S.R. lies north of the northern boundary of the United States, the climate is less than ideal for agricultural production. Average annual temperatures tend to be low with wide differentials between the annual maximum and minimum temperatures. Growing seasons are generally short by United States standards.

Secondly, although it may seem surprising in a country so vast, the Soviet Union has a shortage of land which is suitable for agriculture. Much of the Soviet land is unsuitable: it is either frozen all or most of the year or located in mountainous, arid or semi-arid regions. Of the remaining areas, most are covered with a light, sandy and acid soil (*podsol*) which is not highly productive. The famous "black earth" (*chernozem*) in the U.S.S.R. is a very high quality soil, but tends to be located in areas with poor rainfall.² The Soviet Union has no large areas with a favorable combination of rainfall and soil quality comparable to the United States grain belt. Because of natural limitations alone, it is not surprising that Soviet agricultural performance would be poor by United States standards.

Natural limitations, however, are not the only problems faced by the Soviet agricultural sector. In addition, Soviet agriculture has suffered as a result of the Marxian ideological tradition and the unique institu-

¹ For example, see Wyn F. Owen, "The Double Developmental Squeeze on Agriculture," *American Economic Review*, vol. 56, no. 1, March, 1966, pp. 42-70.

² For a very good discussion of the interrelationships between soil, climate and economic organization in Soviet agriculture, see J. P. Cole and F. C. German, *A Geography of the U.S.S.R.: The Background to a Planned Economy* (London: Butterworth's, 1961), pp. 69-104.

tional arrangements which have evolved in the U.S.S.R. In the Marxian scheme, the industrial proletariat is the only truly revolutionary class in the capitalist society, while the peasants (along with artisans, and small shopkeepers) are basically romantic and reactionary.³

Since the Russian Revolution of 1917 was accomplished in a country whose population was 80 per cent rural, it was essential that the peasantry be at least neutral toward the new regime. However, the Soviet leaders

have traditionally squeezed resources from the agricultural sector to protect their regime (as in the "War Communism" period, 1918–1921) or to support the rapid development of the industrial sector (as in the forced collectivization of agriculture between 1929 and 1937, and in the basic industrialization-at-any-cost approach under Joseph Stalin, 1928–1953).⁴

As a result of the traditionally heavy emphasis on the rapid development of industry (especially the capital goods industries), the agricultural sector under Stalin was forced to serve as an internal source of capital, and to absorb the shocks of rapid industrialization and institutional transformation of the economy. The basic types of agricultural enterprises in the Soviet Union, the collective farm (*kolkhoz*) and the state farm (*sovkhos*),⁵ are a logical consequence of the Marxian ideological emphasis on economies of scale in socialized agriculture and the traditional Soviet goal of extracting the maximum resources from the agricultural sector.⁶

The role of the peasantry in Marxian rhetoric and the traditional Soviet industrialization strategy have had a dramatic impact on Soviet agriculture, and are among the important roots of current Soviet agricultural problems. From the point of view of Soviet officials, the peasant has been someone to be distrusted and "kept in line." As a result, Soviet agricultural enterprises, particularly the collective farms, have been subject to such extensive interference by party and government rules and authorities that there has been a virtual atrophication of initiative. Even under former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, when agricultural problems were given great attention by Soviet officials, there was extensive external interference in the decision-making and management of the farms.⁷

In addition to shaping the attitudes of Soviet officials toward the agricultural sector, the traditional Soviet ethic has produced a society in which agricultural employment has a very low social status. The low social status of agricultural jobs in the Soviet Union

³ For the clearest example of this argument in Marx's writings, see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, translated from the German by Samuel Moore and edited by Samuel Katz (New York: Washington Square Press, 1964), p. 75. The impact of ideology on Soviet agricultural problems is discussed in Alec Nove, "Ideology and Agriculture," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4, April, 1966, pp. 397–407; and in Michael E. Bradley, "Marxism and Soviet Agricultural Problems," in Jan S. Prybyla (ed.), *Comparative Economic Systems* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 89–95.

⁴ For a summary of Soviet agricultural problems and policies in these periods, see Michael E. Bradley, "Wage Determination and Incentive Problems in Soviet Agriculture" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), pp. 26–41 and 51–66.

⁵ Collective farms, the predominant form of agricultural enterprise in the Soviet Union, are defined legally as producers' cooperatives in which the members share in the net income after the farm has met its prior claims. State farms are state-owned enterprises, or "factories in the fields," in which workers are state employees who are paid under the same type of wage system as industrial workers.

⁶ This role of the collective farm is spelled out clearly in the Model Statutes for Agricultural Artels in J. Stalin, *Building Collective Farms* (New York: Workers' Library, 1931), p. 177. Also, see M. Lewin, "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2, October, 1965, pp. 162–197; and Iu. A. Moshkov, "Zernovaia problema v gody kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva," in *Akademiia nauk SSSR, Istoriia Sovetskogo krest'ianstva i kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva v SSSR* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1963), p. 258.

⁷ The problem of administrative interference in the management of collective farms has been treated fairly extensively in Soviet literature. A very good literary treatment of the problem can be found in Fyodor Abramov, *One Day in the New Life* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963). Also, see Alec Nove, "Peasants and Officials," in Jerzy F. Karcz (ed.), *Soviet and East European Agriculture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 57–73. For a very good political study, see Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953–1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

contributes to increasingly serious shortages of trained manpower in the agricultural sector. Studies of the occupational preferences of Soviet secondary school graduates indicate a very low ranking of agricultural occupations by urban and rural graduates alike.⁸ This may pose one of the most serious obstacles to the achievement of Soviet agricultural objectives in the future.

As the younger and more educated members leave, the agricultural population will have an increasingly unfavorable age, educational and skill mix; the quality of the agricultural labor force will tend to decline. In addition to creating a general shortage of agricultural manpower, the emigration from the agricultural sector will make it increasingly difficult to raise agricultural output by increasing agricultural investment and accelerating technological change in the agricultural sector. Without adequately trained personnel, increasing the amount of capital and horsepower per agricultural worker will be relatively ineffective. Mechanized agriculture requires trained personnel to operate and maintain the equipment. There is ample evidence of serious shortages of machinery operators, mechanics, electricians and other skilled manpower in the Soviet agricultural sector; furthermore, the number of new entrants into these jobs comes nowhere near the numbers needed.⁹

Current agricultural problems also stem

from the mistakes of past regimes. Under Stalin, the agricultural sector had become virtually stagnant; gross agricultural production increased by a mere 18 per cent in the entire period from 1928 to 1953. Excluding the war years (1940–1945) and the recovery period (1945–1948), Soviet agricultural output grew at an annual average rate of only 0.9 per cent per year under Stalin.

Following the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's rise to political leadership in 1953, the emphasis of agricultural policy turned dramatically from extracting the agricultural surplus to raising the level of output. Gross agricultural output grew by 51 per cent, or an annual average of 7.1 per cent per year, in the period from 1953 to 1958. Interpreting these results as evidence of the success of his various agricultural campaigns, Khrushchev established goals for the agricultural sector in the Seven Year Plan (1959–1965) which could be described only as euphoric.

The years 1959–1964, however, were "lean years" for Soviet agriculture; agricultural output increased by only 13 per cent or at an annual average rate of 2.6 per cent per year in this period.¹⁰ The actual performance of the agricultural sector, 1959–1965, was far below the highly unrealistic planned goals, exposed Khrushchev's lack of sophistication in dealing with the problems of Soviet agriculture, and was an important factor leading to Khrushchev's dismissal.¹¹

When Brezhnev and Kosygin took control of the Soviet political machinery in 1964, they did not try to play down the importance of agriculture, but their approach to agricultural problems has been markedly different. Khrushchev had failed to deliver on his promises in agriculture because he sought some dramatic change which would provide the solution to all agricultural problems. His search took the form of various agricultural campaigns (the virgin lands campaign, the meat and milk campaign, the corn program, the grasslands campaign) which were hastily conceived and frequently unsound.

Khrushchev also sought the solution in frequent and sweeping administrative re-

⁸ Results summarized and analyzed in Murray Yanowitch and Norton T. Dodge, "The Social Evaluation of Occupations in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review*, vol. 28, no. 3, September, 1969, pp. 621–641.

⁹ See Karl-Eugen Wadekin, "Manpower in Soviet Agriculture—Some Post-Khrushchev Developments and Problems," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3, January, 1969, pp. 281–305.

¹⁰ All data are official figures from Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1963), p. 230; and *idem.*, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1964 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: "Statistika," 1965), p. 246.

¹¹ See Nancy Nimitz, *Agriculture Under Khrushchev: The Lean Years* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1965); Lazar Volin, "Khrushchev and the Soviet Agricultural Scene," in Karcz (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 2–21; and Roy D. Laird, "Khrushchev's Administrative Reforms in Agriculture: An Appraisal," in Karcz, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–56.

forms, such as the reorganization of the machine tractor stations (M.T.S.) and the establishment of territorial production administrations (T.P.A.) to replace the planning functions of the Ministry of Agriculture.¹² These programs generally failed to achieve their objectives, tended to be far more costly than Khrushchev's optimistic expectations, and frequently were inconsistent with each other.¹³

The current Five Year Plan gives evidence of a somewhat more realistic and consistent approach to agricultural problems by the post-Khrushchev political leadership. Although the planned goals are ambitious—for example, a planned increase of 25 per cent over the 1961–1965 period—they are far more realistic than the goals set down by Khrushchev in the Seven Year Plan for 1959–1965. Even with some setbacks in 1969, the gross agricultural output in 1969 was 79 billion rubles, compared to 70.9 billion rubles in 1965. The average annual gross agricultural output of 79 billion rubles for the 1966–1969 period is approximately 20 per cent above the annual average of 66.3 billion rubles for 1961–1965.

¹² Jerzy F. Karcz, "The New Soviet Agricultural Programme," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2, October, 1965, pp. 129–134.

¹³ For example, Khrushchev asserted in 1954 that grain yields in the Virgin Lands would be at least 14–15 centners per hectare, and that 20–25 centners per hectare could be expected. He dismissed yields of 10–11 centners per hectare as "ridiculously low," but in reality these yields were never achieved on all of the Virgin Lands areas in the same year, and the "minimum" yields of 14–15 centners per hectare were never achieved. Nevertheless, over 100 million hectares (triple the original goal) were sown in the Virgin Lands on the basis of Khrushchev's optimism alone. See Bradley, "Wage Determination and Incentive Problems in Soviet Agriculture," *op. cit.*, pp. 73–76. Khrushchev's summary appraisal of the potential of the Virgin Lands is expressed in N. S. Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitiie sel'skogo khoziaistva* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1964), vol. 1, p. 89.

¹⁴ These figures are official data, with gross agricultural output expressed in 1965 prices. The data are taken from "Report of the U.S.S.R. Central Statistical Administration on the Results of the Fulfillment of the State Plan for the Development of the U.S.S.R. National Economy in 1969," *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 25, 1970, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 22, no. 4, February 24, 1970, pp. 3–8; and *SSSR v novoi piateletke: spravochnik* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1966), pp. 78–87.

The output of meat and milk—both of which are of critical importance in providing an improved, higher protein diet for Soviet consumers—averaged 11.4 million tons and 80 million tons per year, respectively, compared to average annual outputs of 9.3 million tons of meat and 64.7 million tons of milk for the period 1961–1965. The planned average annual outputs for 1966–1970 are 11 million tons of meat and 78 million tons of milk per year.

Grain output is somewhat below the planned level—an average annual output of 162.3 million tons per year in the period 1966–1969, slightly below the planned figure of 167 million tons per year for the period 1966–1970—but it is significantly above the average annual output of 130.3 million tons of grain per year in the period 1961–1965.¹⁴ Realistic, planned goals are very important in determining the level of agricultural performance; unattainable goals are not conducive to high levels of morale and incentive for agricultural workers and managers.

The current leadership has not limited its changes in agricultural policy to a revision of the goals of the Khrushchev era. It has undertaken a number of reforms designed to alleviate some of the chronic problems of the agricultural sector and to correct some of the more blatant policy mistakes of its predecessors. One of the first tasks undertaken by the new regime was the restoration of the planning functions of the Ministry of Agriculture which had been delegated to the T.P.A.'s during Khrushchev's regionalization of agricultural planning in 1958–1959. Although the 1958–1959 reforms were promoted by the Soviet leaders as a move toward decentralization and greater independence for the managers of individual farms, they had in fact increased the administrative interference in the management of agricultural enterprises. In addition, there was insufficient coordination of the plans of various regions; regional planning had led to a tendency toward regional self-sufficiency which had a detrimental effect on efficiency.

In a sense, the restoration of the planning

functions of the ministry represents a step toward the greater centralization of planning, removing the planners further from the problems of the individual farms. However, it seems highly unlikely that agricultural planning will return to the degree or form of central control which characterized the Stalin regime. Any potential dangers of overcentralization of control with the restoration of the planning functions of the Ministry of Agriculture should be balanced against the potential gains from the greater emphasis on coordination and interregional specialization in agricultural production. The current leaders, moreover, do not tend to emulate Khrushchev's frequent administrative reshuffling. Instead, they appear to be attempting reforms within a stable institutional and administrative structure.¹⁵

One of Brezhnev's first official statements on agricultural problems cited the critical importance of improving the incentives and productivity of agricultural labor.¹⁶ To improve the level of incentives, policies were undertaken which liberalized the restrictions on the collective farmers' labor input on household plots and revised the system of payment for agricultural workers. In liberalizing the restrictions on the private plots, the Soviet leaders hoped to raise the morale of collective farm members and to increase the level of marketed agricultural output by encouraging greater output from the plots.

¹⁵ Roger A. Clarke, "Soviet Agricultural Reforms Since Khrushchev," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2, October, 1968, p. 159.

¹⁶ L. I. Brezhnev, "O neotlozhnykh merakh po dal'neishemu razvitiu sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR," *Pravda*, March 27, 1965, p. 1.

¹⁷ The private plots are major sources of certain agricultural products in the Soviet Union—meat, milk, melons, and any goods which can be produced with a minimum of capital equipment. Restricting the labor inputs in the private sector created serious shortages of these goods in collective farm markets. The importance of private agriculture and the impact of Khrushchev's restrictions are analyzed in John W. De Pauw, "The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture," *Slavic Review*, vol. 28, no. 1, March, 1969, pp. 63–71; and C. A. Knox Lovell, "The Role of Private Subsidiary Farming During the Soviet Seven-Year Plan, 1959–1965," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1, July, 1968, pp. 46–66.

¹⁸ "Draft of Model Collective Farm Charter is Published," *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, April 24, 1970, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 21, no. 17, May 14, 1969, p. 5.

The official attitude toward the private sector in agriculture is that it will "wither away" as the growing productivity of socialized agriculture becomes able to meet the agricultural needs of the Soviet people. Khrushchev had hoped to accelerate this natural "withering" and to increase the labor input in collective production by placing restrictions on the size of the household plots and increasing the required minimum work-days per member in collective production. The effect of these restrictions, however, was to lower the incentives of collective farm members and to create shortages of the types of agricultural commodities produced on the plots.¹⁷

The new leadership accelerated the collective farm wage reform as a means of improving the incentives of collective farm members. Under the old "labor-day" (*trudoden*) system, labor was paid the residual share of the collective's income and output after the farm had met all of its prior claims. The *trudoden* system was detrimental to incentives since the relationship between effort and payment was unclear. The worker did not know how much he would be paid for his labor at the time he was required to perform it; and the value of an individual's labor depended ultimately on the quality of the labor input of all other members of the collective as well. In addition, income was not distributed regularly through the year, and on some farms the workers received only an annual distribution.

Finally, since labor was paid the residual share under the *trudoden* system, wages did not figure in the costs of production for collectives and no meaningful cost comparisons could be made between collectives and other types of enterprises. By 1968, it was estimated that over 90 per cent of the collective farms in the U.S.S.R. had adopted some form of guaranteed monthly pay. The new Model Charter for Collective Farms specifically states that a member has the right "... to receive work in the public economy of the collective farm with guaranteed pay in accordance with the quantity and quality of labor he contributes."¹⁸

Since 1965, various policies have been undertaken which are designed to improve the chronically poor financial position of collective farms. Resource allocations to agriculture have been increased, delivery prices for sales to the state have been raised, and more short-term and long-term credit has been made available to agricultural enterprises. In the Khrushchev era, grandiose agricultural programs and goals were frequently not backed up with adequate resources; some of Khrushchev's policies actually worsened the financial condition of the collectives—the reorganization of the M.T.S., which required the farms to purchase and maintain their own machinery, is a good example.¹⁹

Official policy statements of the current regime, as well as those of Stalin and Khrushchev, have advocated the elimination of the differences between collective and state farms as forms of “socialist property.” The partial conversion of the collective farm wage system from residual distribution to a regular money wage system is an example of a step in this direction. In addition, the extension of the rules of “economic accountability” (*khozraschet*) to collective and state farms is another. With the establishment of unified wage systems and accounting rules for all types of enterprises, quantitative cost and efficiency comparisons between firms can be made more easily. This should improve the information available to the authorities to aid in more efficient allocation of resources.

There is increasing discussion in the Soviet Union on changes in the organization of agricultural enterprises which are designed to alleviate or remove some of the difficulties inherent in large-scale, relatively labor-intensive agricultural production. These difficulties seem to have been largely overlooked by Khrushchev in his advocacy of amalgamation of collectives to form “supercollectives” or *agrogorody* (agricultural cities). Since the agricultural production process is so long,

it is hard to pinpoint individual responsibility for poor performance. The results of poor work at the beginning of the production cycle (plowing and planting) will not be apparent until the harvest several months later; adequate managerial supervision of large numbers of workers dispersed over such a wide area is nearly impossible.

Noting the greater efforts expended by collective farmers during the time they spend on their private plots than during the time they spend in collective work, some Soviet experts have advocated that the collective and state farms be broken down into smaller units, each of which would be the responsibility of a small group of farmers called a “link” (*zveno*). The *zveno* would be responsible for the delivery of products to the farm, but would have considerably greater flexibility and autonomy than exists under current intrafarm administrative arrangements. On the farms where this approach has been tried on an experimental basis, the reported results seem encouraging. If successfully implemented, this type of intrafarm reorganization would change the operation of the farms considerably and could reduce the difficulties of central management of collective and state farms.²⁰

Although it is not possible to change the seasonality of agricultural production by administrative changes, it is possible to reduce the seasonal fluctuations in the utilization of labor on collective and state farms. Unless the seasonality of labor utilization on the farms is reduced, an agricultural work force adequate to meet periods of peak demand would face extensive unemployment or underemployment during the remainder of the year. Of course, farms can and do hire temporary workers at harvest time and other periods of peak demand, but the temporary workers are typically less productive and efficient.

(Continued on page 244)

¹⁹ On the M.T.S. reorganization, see Nimitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–12.

²⁰ Clarke, *op. cit.*, pp. 175–176. Also see V. Zhulin, “Kto ty, zemli khoziain?” *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, vol. 41, no. 184, August 7, 1965, pp. 1–2.

Michael E. Bradley is a specialist in comparative economic systems. He is currently focusing his attention on Soviet agriculture, particularly on the incentive problems of collective farms.

Noting that "students of the Soviet economy have often puzzled over the dramatic unevenness of Soviet economic growth," this economist concludes that "The Soviets need an incentive system that stimulates factory managers continuously to seek out and introduce new products and processes. Unless reform proposals and programs are implemented, it is hard to see how the Soviets will be able . . . to keep pace in the technological race of the 1970's."

The Soviet Dual Economy

BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN
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ECONOMISTS HAVE NOTICED that alongside the traditional and often primitive sectors of a developing country's economy, there often exists another sector as modern as comparable operations in the developed countries of the world. Thus, outside a modern Indian oil refinery or chemical plant, peasants and their oxen plow peacefully, as their ancestors did hundreds of years ago. Researchers have found that often there is little, if any, contact between the two sectors. If the modern sector were to disappear, those in the traditional sector would sometimes never know the difference. Similarly, the modern sector is often only slightly affected by any difficulties in the traditional sector. In effect, the two economies tend to operate not as one interrelated economy, but as two—a dual economy.

The phenomenon of two distinct sub-economies responding to essentially their own sets of signals is usually considered a peculiarity of the developing countries. By contrast, in the richer, developed countries, the rewards of sustained economic growth normally percolate through the various layers of economic activity. As a result, most of the sectors of the economy generally react more as a unified entity to the same signals and to one another. Thus, a farmer in a developed society drives a tractor fueled by

oil from the refinery in order to produce crops that he expects to sell rather than to consume personally.

Since the U.S.S.R. is the world's second largest economic power, second only to the United States, the concepts used to evaluate underdeveloped countries should be inappropriate when discussing the Soviet Union. In many ways they are. Even though it is still a familiar sight to see a modern Soviet jet flying over the head of a Russian peasant driving his horse cart or an urban housewife carrying her water buckets, the Soviets do not have a dual economy in the conventional sense just described. Still, students of the Soviet economy have often puzzled over the dramatic unevenness of Soviet economic growth. Some sectors of the economy seem to flourish, while others seem to flounder for reasons considerably different from those which explain success and failure in the West. The Soviets have often astounded the world with their accomplishments in space, defense and science while perplexing the world by their continued failures in agriculture and light industry. The Soviet economy resembles a patient whose one leg is shorter than the other. The patient can still walk, but his movements are wobbly at times, and periodically he falls behind his peers despite the strength in his good leg.

The strengths of the Soviet system can be impressive. The very fact that the Russians now have the world's second largest G.N.P. is a noteworthy accomplishment, especially when it is remembered that prior to the revolution Russia was regarded as a fairly backward industrial power. In 1913, the Russians produced only 4 million metric tons of steel and 29 million metric tons of coal.¹ In 1969, they produced 110 million metric tons of steel and 608 million metric tons of coal, exceeding United States production in the case of coal and almost matching it in the case of steel.² When it comes to the traditional types of heavy industrial products, the Russians have indeed worked a remarkable transformation.

The reasons for the Soviet success in planning and producing such products so rapidly are generally agreed upon both in this country and in the U.S.S.R. Working with an essentially unskilled labor force, the Soviets devised an incentive system that placed primary stress on the quantity of goods produced. As long as the production process was a simple one and required only raw labor and unsophisticated machinery, all the Soviets had to do to increase production was to keep adding labor and capital. Furthermore, the state proved to be an effective agent for the task of mobilizing and utilizing both labor and capital. Since there was no private competition or interference, the state could collect and direct resources wherever it saw fit and in quantities greater than would have been possible in a less regimented type of society.

ECONOMIES OF SCALE

There were important advantages to this type of centralized control. Soviet engineers were able to design their equipment in order to take advantage of economies of scale. It was not long before the Russians were building the world's largest blast and open hearth

furnaces. This generally made for very high productivity. Similarly, because all the electric power plants were owned by the state, the Soviet electrical system could be designed as one interconnected grid. This meant that excess capacity in one area could easily be shuttled to deficit areas. The net effect was to utilize existing capacity more effectively and again to take advantage of economies of scale by building larger but fewer power plants. The Soviets were several decades ahead of the United States in providing for such an integrated network.

The power to command and concentrate their resources brought the Soviets economies of scale in other areas as well. Because they could decree that all urban housing should take the form of multistory apartment buildings and because all the contractors were state agencies, Soviet construction officials found it relatively easy to mechanize the heretofore piecemeal or custom approach to housing construction. Throughout the country, workshops were set up to build and assemble apartment components into prefabricated sections. These prefabricated sections were then transported and installed by specially designed equipment that could pay for itself only because it would be continuously used in one state housing project after another.

The Soviets adopted a similar approach in their fishing operations. The normal private operator in the non-Communist world sends out a fishing fleet which, after a few days or weeks, must transport its catch back to its home port for processing. Once its catch is unloaded, the fleet then returns to sea again. Naturally, a good deal of time is lost in commuting. Recognizing this, the Soviets assigned a fleet of large mother ships to accompany their fleet of fishing trawlers. The mother ships service the trawlers and process the fish, eliminating the need for the Russian fishing fleet to return to its home base after each catch. The boats can unload at sea and immediately resume their fishing. But this can only be done because the Soviets control the country's entire fishing fleet and therefore can assign enough trawlers to one

¹ Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie (hereafter TsSU), *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 g.* Moscow Statistika, 1969, pp. 238, 241.

² *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 5, January, 1970, p. 3.

area to keep the mother ship fully occupied. There have been few if any private fishing operations that can command the resources necessary for activities on such a scale.

The illustration of the electrical power, housing and fishing operations could be supplemented by descriptions of the book publishing industry, or hydroelectric station and subway construction. But not all such opportunities have been fully exercised by the Soviets. Several gaps still exist in the operation of their economy. Inadequate concern about household sanitation and pollution is only one example. Moreover, the quality of their construction and housing is woefully poor. Yet, considering the total amount available for consumption, the Russians find themselves relatively better provided with the "social balance" that John Kenneth Galbraith often found neglected in favor of private goods in the United States.³

The power to command resources has also proved to be beneficial for the Soviets even when there were no economies of scale to be gained. Because their labor forces' overall level of skill and competence was low, the Soviets often found it wise to skim off the best craftsmen and engineers and concentrate them in elite work forces. Such groups would then be assigned high priority tasks, especially in the fields of space exploration or defense. Advanced laboratories and institutes were created throughout the country. Generally, it was through the work of such special facilities and staffs that the Soviets were able to score their scientific breakthroughs and to win recognition for their technological research.⁴ These accomplishments were achieved even though conditions in most of the economy were considerably more primitive and inefficient.

THE WEAK LEG

The Soviets realize that a substantial portion of their dual economy suffers from low

productivity, which is not always offset by the advanced sector.⁵ Their periodic troubles are reflected in Soviet economic growth rates. According to their own statistics and their own definitions, the growth of the Soviet national income slowed in 1962 and 1963 and again somewhat in 1969.⁶ Of course, growth rates in the West and Japan have also experienced periodic dips. Moreover, leaders and economists in the United States have frequently warned about the state of the American economy and have similarly pointed out that some sectors—i.e., textiles and the shoe industry—have not kept pace with the advanced sectors. Nonetheless, while not unique to the Soviet Union, the weaknesses of the Soviet economic system appear to be more far reaching and pervasive. There is much more of a gap between the leading and the lagging sectors in the U.S.S.R.

What explains this dichotomy? In economics, as in cooking, too much of anything can spoil the most elaborate preparation. The Soviets have benefited from the centralized mobilization and allocation of capital and labor. Offsetting these advantages, however, are the shortcomings that arise when managers and administrators at the lower echelons find themselves unable to exercise spontaneous initiative. It is true that many important processes and products can be anticipated, designed and produced by decisions which originate and are controlled at the top of the Soviet economic structure. But several Soviet economists have pointed out that, in contrast to the Soviet Union, many processes and products in other economies are developed on the spot. This reflects the traditional debate between the centralizers and the decentralizers. Today, the Soviet Union is able to avail itself of the benefits that stem from centralization, but it foregoes the benefits that would accrue from decentralization. The lost opportunities show up in many ways. This makes the various efforts to correct this one-sidedness all the more urgent.

One of the more serious dilemmas confronting the Soviets is that their plant managers resist innovation. Even when new

³ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1958), p. 251.

⁴ *Izvestia*, May 15, 1970, p. 3.

⁵ *Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia*, April 14, 1970, p. 2; *Pravda*, May 15, 1970, p. 2.

⁶ *TsSU, op. cit.*, p. 569; *Ekonomicheskaiia Gazeta*, No. 5, January, 1970, p. 3.

products and processes have been successfully worked out and tested at the laboratory stage, Soviet managers still try to keep them out of their factories. Such resistance is so pervasive because of existing incentive and pricing systems. Price increases for new and improved products are often hard to obtain. Therefore, the typical manager finds that there is not much prize money to be won if he risks change or conducts experiments. Furthermore, any deviation from the existing pattern of operations jeopardizes his chances of fulfilling the assigned targets, in terms of quantities produced or profits earned. Under the circumstances, most factory managers calculate that they are better off with the status quo than chancing a small but risky gain.⁷

Since all the capital and other productive resources are controlled by the central government, Soviet central planners must have the wisdom and foresight to anticipate the production and consumption needs of the whole country. Inevitably, shortcomings and gaps appear, often because consumption needs seem too trivial to demand the concentrated attention of the busy central planners in Moscow. Lack of concern for such petty items may explain the absence of ball-point pens until around 1968 and the continued Soviet failure to produce scotch tape. Occasionally, however, the absence or limited supply of such gadgets cause more than slight inconvenience. For example, because no one cared about the production of quality paper and punch cards, the Soviets found that, unlike the rest of the world, they could not rely on punch cards and paper tape in their computer systems. Instead, they were forced to substitute plastic tape, usually film, which often proved to be unsatisfactory.⁸

The difficulties the Soviets have had with their computers illustrate another disadvantage of centralized control. Not only has

there been a lag in the development of peripheral equipment, but often centralized control has not proved capable of coping with very rapid technological changes. Again, it is impossible for a central administrator to anticipate or keep abreast of all the possible improvements in several rapidly developing fields. Of course, certain priorities can be established, and the best engineers and scientists can be ordered to work on various projects with an open budget at their disposal. But only so many priorities can be established at one time. Inevitably, the non-priority projects fall behind. This helps to explain the Soviet backwardness in so many branches of electronics, computer technology and chemistry. Despite the fact that certain of these areas warrant priority treatment, overall progress has lagged. One specialist calculates that the Soviets were further behind the West in computer technology in 1964 than they were in the early 1950's.⁹ The gap apparently narrowed slightly in 1965.

PLANNING ERRORS

While such shortcomings may be partially explained by the absence of local control and innovation, occasionally they may stem directly from centralized control. What happens when the central planners make a mistake? This is precisely what happened when Soviet planners put all their computers, as it were, in one basket. In the early 1960's, Soviet planners decided to make all their computer transistors out of the element germanium rather than silicon.¹⁰ Technologically, this turned out to be the wrong decision and caused a considerable loss of time, effort and money. Those computer manufacturers in the West who made similar decisions suffered the consequences, and they also found that further development was impossible. But some Western manufacturers chose silicon transistors and moved ahead to success. In the U.S.S.R., however, the effect of the central planner's decision was to eliminate all the other alternative possibilities. Consequently, the whole industry suffered.

⁷ *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 8, February, 1970, p. 8.

⁸ Richard Judy, "The Case of Computer Technology," in Stanislaw Wasowski, editor, *East-West Trade and the Technology Gap* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 54, 57.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁰ *Data Week*, January 14, 1970.

A similar mistake was made in the early 1950's when the central planners insisted on retaining coal as the main source of fuel, while businessmen in the rest of the world were switching to oil, gasoline and natural gas. Only belatedly did Soviet planners recognize the higher efficiency of liquid fuels. Again, the blame for the mistake falls squarely on the central planners.

It may be true that the Soviets seem better able to provide "social balance." At the same time, however, when a government is given complete control over a country's natural resources, there is a tendency to concentrate so much on heavy industry and social balance that personal consumption may be neglected. As some have charged, there may be "private imbalance." This is just the reverse of the problem Galbraith saw in the United States. Because in East Europe no one has had the power or desire to counter the power of the central planners, personal consumption has suffered. Recognition of this situation has now even percolated to the top ranks of Soviet leadership. In a rather remarkable speech, Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev himself began to question the order of Soviet priorities in 1970:

It will not be very difficult for us to produce 120–125 million metric tons of steel a year . . . but the main question now is, not only how much of something we can produce, but at what price and with how much labor.¹¹

Previously, he and his predecessors were only concerned about how much could be produced. In this same speech, Brezhnev went on to complain that even though large quantities of new housing were being built:

. . . unfortunately, everything is not going well. There are many cases where certain provinces and districts have built large numbers of administrative buildings, stadiums, clubs and other facilities not intended in the plan and [financed them] at the expense of new housing.¹²

¹¹ *Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia*, April 14, 1970, p. 2.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ See pp. 226 ff. in this issue for a discussion of Soviet agriculture.

¹⁴ *Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta*, No. 11, March, 1970, p. 5.

It remains to be seen to what extent such excesses are prevented in the future.

ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

In an effort to cope with such difficulties and bring the lagging half of the economy up to the advanced half, in early 1966 the Russians introduced a sweeping series of reforms in both industry and agriculture.¹³ More than 90 per cent of all Soviet industry has been converted to the new system of operation. A valiant effort has been made to delegate more power to the enterprise manager and to minimize the traditional compulsion to concentrate on quantitative targets. Today, factory managers receive bonuses when they meet sales and profit targets. The replacement of the outmoded incentive system has been supplemented by a thoroughgoing price reform introduced in 1967. This represented an attempt to attach more meaningful economic values to the factors of production. Supplementary price adjustments are scheduled in 1970–1972.¹⁴ Some initial steps have also been taken to relax controls over the allocation and distribution of goods to manufacturers. New wholesaling centers run by *Gossnab*, the Ministry of Supply, have been established. They freely sell a growing number of supplies to other manufacturers without the requisitions and authorizations that formerly had to be obtained 6 to 12 months in advance. In an attempt to provide for a more rational use of capital, interest charges are now collected and some factory managers have been authorized to make their own capital-spending plans.

Much of the initial promise of the reforms has not been realized. Bureaucrats in the various ministries and planning organizations have consistently fought efforts to delegate meaningful authority to the enterprise manager. In some cases, this is because the central planners do not trust the local managers to make the proper decisions; in other cases, the central planners are bureaucrats who do not want to lose their power. Despite such opposition, a surprising amount of progress was being made in implementing the re-

forms, at least until August, 1968. Then, when the Soviets saw that the Czech economic reforms generated "dangerous" political demands, they aborted the Czech experiment and lessened their own efforts at reform.

Unfortunately for the Soviets, their half-hearted attempts at reform have not brought about any long-run solution of their economic problems. The present situation appears to be a compromise between the hardliners who oppose all change and the liberals who recognize that in a world of rapidly changing technology, the old central control methods will not work.

The struggle between the centralizers and the decentralizers is not over. Complaints about the need for improvement continue to emanate from high places.¹⁵ Moreover, some forms of experimentation are still being introduced. Shchekino, a large chemical complex near Tula, has been widely touted for its efforts to increase productivity. From 1967 to 1970, the work force of the factory was reduced by over 1,000 employees, yet output increased by almost 90 per cent in the same period.¹⁶ The workers were induced to join in this experiment with the promise that they could divide 50 per cent of the resulting savings in wages among themselves. With the proceeds from this savings, the wages of those who remained were increased by as much as 30 per cent. The experiment at Shchekino is now being copied. By the spring of 1970, 60 factories with 400,000 employees were conducting similar experiments.¹⁷

AUTARCHY ABANDONED

The Soviets are also attempting to solve some of their productivity problems by relying more on foreign equipment and technology. In an abrupt reversal, the Soviets abandoned their espousal of autarchy and

have recognized the advantages to be gained by availing themselves of the latest in international technology. As Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin pointed out in 1966, in the long run it would be much cheaper to import or license foreign processes than to try to recreate them.¹⁸ In implementing this decision, the Soviets have imported over \$2 billion worth of plant and equipment from West Europe and Japan. These imports range from Italian-built supermarkets and English petrochemical plants to Italian and French automobile factories.

CONCLUSION

Although many of these reforms and decisions make good sense and promise an immediate improvement in productivity and quality in the lagging portions of the economy, the Soviets continue to face the task of generating such improvements internally and on a self-sustaining basis. The fulfillment of this aim seems a long way off. The purchase of the latest in Western or Japanese technology makes the Soviets temporarily competitive, but the physical machinery alone is not enough. The question remains—how effective will this technology be once it starts to operate in an economy with an outmoded incentive system?

The Soviets need an incentive system that stimulates factory managers continuously to seek out and introduce new products and processes. Unless reform proposals and programs are implemented, it is hard to see how the Soviets will be able to transform their dual economy into a unified and technologically innovative entity to keep pace in the technological race of the 1970's.

Marshall I. Goldman, a contributing editor of *Current History*, is an Associate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. He is the author of *Soviet Economy: Myth and Reality* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), *Soviet Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1965), and *Soviet Marketing* (New York: Free Press, 1963), among other books.

¹⁵ *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, April 14, 1970, p. 2.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, January 23, 1970, p. 2.

¹⁷ *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 10, March, 1970, p. 11.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, April 6, 1966, p. 7.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Soviet - West German Treaty

Twenty-five years after the end of World War II, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt signed a nonaggression treaty which binds the two nations to respect the current European frontiers. The treaty, signed August 12, 1970, in the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow, must be ratified by the West German Bundestag and the Supreme Soviet. The text of the treaty, as released by West German newspapers, and the text of the accompanying annexes, follow:

The high contracting parties have agreed,

In the endeavor to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and the world,

In the conviction that peaceful cooperation between states on the foundation of the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations corresponds to the most ardent desires of the nations and the general interests of international peace,

In appreciation of the fact that previously realized agreed measures, particularly the conclusion of the treaty of September 13, 1955, concerning the assumption of diplomatic relations, have created favorable conditions for new important steps for the further development and strengthening of their mutual relations,

In the desire to give expression in contractual form to their determination toward improvement and expansion of cooperation between them, including economic relations as well as scientific, technical and cultural ties, in the interest of both states, as follows:

ARTICLE ONE

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regard it as an important goal of their policy to maintain international peace and to attain relaxation of tension.

They declare their endeavor to foster the normalization of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations between all European states, and proceed thereby from the existing real situation in this region.

ARTICLE TWO

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be guided in their mutual relations as well as in questions of the guaranteeing of European and international peace

by the aims and principles which are laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

Accordingly, they will solve their disputes exclusively with peaceful means and assume the obligation to refrain, pursuant to Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat of force or the use of force in questions which affect security in Europe and international security.

ARTICLE THREE

In accordance with the aforementioned aims and principles, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are agreed in the recognition that peace in Europe can only be maintained when no one infringes the present frontiers.

They oblige themselves to respect unreservedly the territorial integrity of all states in Europe in their present frontiers.

They declare that they have no territorial demands against anyone, nor will they have such in the future.

They regard the frontiers of all the states in Europe today and in future as inviolable, as they stand on the day of the signing of this treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line, which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland, and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

ARTICLE FOUR

This treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not affect bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements previously concluded by them.

ARTICLE FIVE

This treaty requires ratification and takes effect on the day of ratification, which is to take place in Bonn.

(Continued on page 246)

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

IN QUEST OF JUSTICE: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY. EDITED BY ABRAHAM BRUMBERG. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 477 pages, appendix and bibliographical notes, \$10.95.)

For reasons which can be explained only partially, Soviet authorities have thus far avoided using the methods of Joseph Stalin to curb, curtail and stifle articulated dissent. In various areas of Soviet life, courageous individuals have risked all to protest injustice and discrimination in Soviet life. This valuable and illuminating collection of materials brings together most of the notable manifestos and essays that have appeared overtly and covertly in recent years. Five brief but penetrating essays by Abraham Brumberg, Sidney Monas, Stephen Weiner, George Luckyj and Peter Reddaway provide contemporary perspective for the primary source materials.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE NEHRU ERA. BY ARTHUR STEIN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 320 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$9.50.)

The two nonaligned countries which have received the most attention from the Soviet Union since 1955 are India and the United Arab Republic. Of the two, India may be of greater long-term significance for Moscow because of her geographic location, size and adversary relationship with Communist China.

Arthur Stein has written an informative account of the evolving Soviet-Indian relationship, particularly from the perspective of New Delhi. Adopting an essentially chronological approach, he traces

the situation from the Stalin period to the cordiality of the Nehru era. As relations with China worsened, India sought, and obtained, increasing assistance and support from the Soviet Union. Two chapters treat economic and cultural ties. This useful volume provides a necessary background for an understanding of relations between the Soviet Union and India.

A.Z.R.

MASS MEDIA IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY MARK W. HOPKINS. (New York: Pegasus, 1970. 384 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

Mark Hopkins, an American journalist with solid credentials as a specialist on Soviet society, has written an informative, original study of the way in which news and information are gathered, edited, interpreted, and packaged in the Soviet Union. He describes the historical evolution of the various mass media under Bolshevik rule and the key institutions shaping the image that the Soviet leadership wants the citizenry to have of Soviet society and of the outside world.

A.Z.R.

RUSSIA'S ROAD FROM PEACE TO WAR: SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS 1917-1941. BY LOUIS FISCHER. (New York: Harper and Row, 1969. 499 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

Louis Fischer was one of the first genuine specialists on Soviet foreign policy: he spent many years in the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution; he knew many of the original Bolsheviks on a personal basis; and he was a perceptive political analyst.

The present study, covering in rich and anecdotal detail the 1917 to 1941 period, may be regarded as Fischer's definitive statement on the period.

A.Z.R.

THE U.S.S.R. ARMS THE THIRD WORLD: CASE STUDIES IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. BY URI RA'ANAN. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 256 pages and index, \$10.00.)

Regrettably, the problem of great power arms shipments to the economically backward nations in the post-1945 period has not attracted extensive scholarly interest. This lucid and articulate study by Uri Ra'anana, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is therefore all the more welcome an addition to this vital subject. In Part One, the author discusses the genesis of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955. Part Two examines relations between the recipient and the donor in the light of Moscow's experience as arms supplier to Indonesia.

Ra'anana is correct in arguing that "the antecedents, course and implications" of the 1955 deal have been largely misinterpreted in the West and offers his own, painstakingly researched and mostly plausible version of events which led to the consummation of the accord. His emphasis on the *political* (rather than military) significance of the agreement is justifiable but, in his preoccupation with the policies of the West, the author has underplayed the importance of Israel in the eyes of Cairo's decision-makers.

In the thought-provoking epilogue, Ra'anana raises the basic question of the efficacy of Moscow's arms export policy and arrives at the conclusion (shared, paradoxically, by Molotov in early 1955) that a massive Soviet involvement in the Third World was not in the best interests of the U.S.S.R.

O. M. Smolansky
Lehigh University

SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY J. C. HUREWITZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, for the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 1969. 250 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$7.00.)

This is an excellent, wide-ranging volume on various aspects of U.S.-Soviet competition and conflict in the Middle East. The papers were originally presented at Columbia University in December, 1968, by a distinguished panel of Middle East and Soviet experts. Included are discussions of the military, economic, cultural, and political involvement of the two superpowers, and a sobering prognosis of the area's future.

Norman F. Howard
The American University

STALIN AND HIS GENERALS. EDITED BY SEWERYN BIALER. (New York: Pegasus, 1969. 644 pages, \$10.00.)

Bialer has succeeded in putting together a fascinating album of the Soviet political leadership, the strategic and tactical decision-making process, and the relationship between Joseph Stalin and his immediate and more distant associates in the course of the prosecution of the Second World War. Tracing the kaleidoscope of faces and events from the sudden German attack on the U.S.S.R. to the final assault on Berlin as reflected in Soviet memoir literature, the editor pinpoints the role of the various individuals in determining the fortunes of war from the Soviet side, where the actors stood vis-à-vis each other and with respect to the Supreme Commander and the latter's contribution, positive as well as negative, to the conduct of Russia's war effort. A lengthy introduction analyzes the pitfalls of historical writing in the U.S.S.R., the reliability of the materials published in the Soviet Union, the kind of corrective that must be introduced to allow for personal as well as policy biases, the effect of the abrupt elevation or fall from grace of an important figure on the treatment of certain episodes of the war record, and the different trends discernible in Soviet historical writing concerning the late global conflict over the last quarter of a century.

George Ginsburgs
New School for Social Research

THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION

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in Asia, Japan emerged as a fourth contestant. In India, the Soviets and Americans struggled for influence. In Pakistan, the Chinese were dominant, whereas in Burma, Ceylon and North Vietnam, the Soviets sought to limit the Chinese presence. In 1969, the Kremlin offered a new defense arrangement to the nations of Southeast Asia as a guarantee against Chinese expansion. Soviet purpose seemed clear enough—the successful extension of Soviet political and economic influence at the expense of the United States, Britain and China.

Against this background of conflict and distrust, Washington and Moscow faced difficulty in stabilizing their relationship at the nuclear level. In some measure, the nuclear competition was the most costly and potentially catastrophic of all the cold war confrontations. Recognizing the limited gains from further nuclear expansion, the United States and the U.S.S.R. inaugurated the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) at Helsinki in 1969, transferring them to Vienna in April, 1970. These talks inspired the hope that the arms race might be scaled down. Still, the obstacles to agreement remained formidable. The Kremlin continued to ring Moscow with antiballistic missiles, expand its nuclear submarine fleet, and develop its arsenal of multiheaded nuclear missiles. For many Americans, including the Nixon administration, the Soviet supermissiles demanded an expanded Safeguard antiballistic missile system (ABM) as well as the further development of the multiheaded offensive missiles (MIRV). The Soviet concentration on Safeguard convinced the President that the further development of that system would give the United States bargaining leverage at the SALT talks. With the search for agreement scarcely begun, President Nixon refused to give the United States negotiators in Vienna any specific instructions. SALT would succeed only to the extent that it guaranteed the nuclear balance.

In the global jockeying for position between the United States and the U.S.S.R., little was strange or unprecedented. The two nations had moved onto the world stage in the postwar era with a natural rivalry, exacerbated perhaps by the unprecedented strength and the globalist doctrines which they commanded. Their struggle for power, combined with that of China, was not unlike the imperial competition among Britain, France and Germany a century earlier, as those three nations reached out almost simultaneously to possess what they could in the Afro-Asian world. Perhaps it was true that every Soviet move into Asia and the Middle East after 1950 was merely one piece in a global design. But it seemed equally true that the Soviet economic, political and diplomatic offensive seldom transcended the bounds of normal great-power behavior.

Thus the Soviet-American collision could be comprehended in historic terms. The United States assumed its role of world leadership after 1947 as a "have" nation, determined to preserve as much of the pre-1939 world order as possible. The Soviets emerged from the war without any traditional allegiance to the Versailles system, and yet the Versailles Treaty still defined the only legally constituted world acceptable to the Western powers. The Atlantic Charter, with its emphasis on self-determination, re-established the legitimacy of the Versailles structure after Germany's defeat. Thereafter the Soviets could expand nowhere—not even into Slavic Europe—without challenging a legal framework which upheld the interests of the Western democracies.

Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R., in its narrow victory over Germany, had gained the right to challenge Versailles as well as the power to exploit the opportunities soon to be created by the collapse of Western authority in much of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The real issue confronting the United States after mid-century was not whether the Soviet Union would play an expanded role in world affairs, but whether that role would recognize the continuing interests of other nations in areas of Soviet penetration.

THE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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good-neighborly, although their attachment to the American connection has markedly cooled. But the Soviet Union may hope for an extra dividend from its progress in Arabia. If Turkey finds Soviet power well entrenched to the south, as well as to the north, east, and west, she may find it difficult to resist limitations on her freedom of action similar to those which hedge the independence of Finland and Afghanistan.

This remains for the future. For the present, the Soviet Union has acquired an indefinable sphere of influence centered on the United Arab Republic, encompassing half a dozen countries and lapping into several others. Their degree of dependence is extremely difficult for the far-away outsider (perhaps even for the insider) to estimate, because both sides go to great lengths to minimize it—the one to save pride, the other to sustain an image of harmless beneficence. It is a token of this attitude that Nasser regularly plays down the Soviet presence in his country; his trip to Moscow in January, 1970, was officially secret. Soviet hegemony is everywhere screened; Soviet “republics,” de facto administrative districts of a highly centralized government, have all the trappings (at least verbally) of independence and are touted as enjoying sovereignty immeasurably above that of unhappy capitalist nations. In the Soviet sphere, formalities have more relation to psychological salve than to political facts, making a harsh reality easier to accept.

However it may be assessed, the Soviet Union has obviously acquired a semi-empire of a new kind, established in the name of anti-imperialism and national liberation, but a true sphere of influence in terms of the dominance of a great power and the dependence of weaker ones. It is the first mark of a protectorate that the protected state gives up the autonomy of its foreign policy. This autonomy the Arab client states have largely

relinquished. They follow Soviet foreign policy almost as completely as the East European satellites, even on issues not directly related to their concerns. It is striking that the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq were—as though by reflex—much more faithful in support of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (which they subsequently linked to their own anti-Zionist cause) than were the Communist parties of West Europe, a lesson which the Soviets no doubt noted in their books. Since 1968, bonds between the Soviet Union and its Arab dependents have been further strengthened; it is a sign of the times that Radio Cairo daily broadcasts in Russian.

The existence of this Soviet sphere of influence is a signal fact of the present world scene. For the United States, it implies a series of problems which this country is ill-prepared to face; for the Soviet system, it means a substantial extension of responsibilities. It may ultimately become comparable in significance to the Soviet sway in East Europe. Its full effects on Soviet foreign policy, on the Soviet system, and on world communism have yet to be realized.

THE SOVIET UNION AND WEST EUROPE

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West, in their almost passionate search for an accommodation with the U.S.S.R., seem disinclined to look this reality in the face. When, in the name of the entire German nation, Brandt suggested measures to ease relations, he was rebuffed by East German Premier Willi Stoph's statement that there must be two different and separate German states because one is socialist and the other is capitalist. Applied to overall East-West relations this clearly means that the rift will continue because of irreconcilable systemic differences. A genuine détente would tend to make absurd the rationale of the Soviet state and its Communist ideology. Therefore, East-West relations cannot be expected to improve as long as the Soviet Union retains and lives by its basic revolutionary tenets.

While the Soviet system prevails, there is little hope for more than a tenuous "peaceful coexistence"; a ban on nuclear weapons would only emphasize Soviet conventional superiority in men and weapons. Optimistically, a new generation of Russian leaders may some day effect a "pragmatic revolution," a revolution of thought rather than of force. It

would involve putting the world's best minds, wherever located, to work in developing the economic, social, political, technological, biogenetic and ecological tools to insure a livable world in the next millenium.¹⁶

Admittedly, such a revolution is needed in the West as well, but in the West it is on its way already because we have at last acknowledged the enormous problems with which we are faced. The Soviet Union is far from this recognition and holds to its ideological investments. It has become the world's most reactionary power and, unless it changes its line, a durable peace is light-years away.¹⁷

¹⁶ Stanley, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁷ Cf. Soviet statements in Sven Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty: A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe* (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1970), p. 242 and *passim*.

DISSENT AND STABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION

(Continued from page 225)

Can the Soviet leaders really hope to achieve political and social long-range stability in the bloc by these policies? The Hungarian and Czech episodes decisively proved that with overwhelming military force they can keep East Europe suppressed and in a colonial status indefinitely. The so-called Brezhnev doctrine indicates their intention to do just that. Colonial liberalization movements or an effective underground are only possible where the odds indicate some chance of success. Thus East Europe represents no problem as long as the Soviet Union itself remains determined and stable. The key lies in the Soviet future.

It would be naive to underestimate the ability of the Soviet regime to continue to hold its system in a firm grip. Over half of the countries of the world are today under authoritarian rule and in a majority of these, elites without the political organization or the economic growth of the Soviet Union have managed to retain power for long periods. The Russian people have no historical period of popular rule to look back to—although some dissidents have created a myth of democracy out of Lenin's leadership.

There are, however, three conditions in the Soviet Union which may make the situation there different from other authoritarian states. First, the Soviet Union has created one of the most highly educated elites in the world, and this elite is showing definite signs of demanding to be heard. Second, the Soviet people of all classes, at great sacrifices, have made their country a great power, and they would like the advantages and freedoms to which they feel this position entitles them. Third, a post-totalitarian-educated generation has yet to take over the reigns of power. Today, Stalin's lieutenants still rule after almost 20 years with little help from the generation now in its forties and fifties, a generation which did not take over because its ranks were so depleted by World War II. Thus, the next major shift in power is likely to skip over this group and bring in the post-Stalin generation. It is difficult to predict what this new generation, highly educated and brought up in an atmosphere of relative affluence and freedom from terror, will do when it finally takes over. Can the special features of the U.S.S.R.'s great power position overcome the strong tradition of autocracy in Russian history and the highly developed party and government bureaucracies who will not want to give up their prerogatives? In the long run the Soviet regime, which has suffered serious shocks before, may be able to absorb and adapt to these new conditions and still keep the essential authoritarian, collective nature of the system.

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET AGRICULTURE

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cient than the regular agricultural workers.

In order to alleviate the problem of seasonality in the utilization of labor in agricultural production, "subsidiary industrial production" on collective and state farms is being expanded gradually. In some instances, food processing plants have been established on farms to process the output of a single farm or of several farms in the immediate vicinity. Advocates of shifting food processing operations to the countryside cite the potential savings because of lower transportation costs, less spoilage and waste, and reduced seasonal unemployment of the agricultural labor force. It has also been suggested that facilities for the production of certain types of industrial goods be established or expanded on the farms. The establishment of industrial production facilities on the farms is in the tradition of (but does not necessarily take the same form as) the pre-Revolutionary cottage industries which according to at least one Soviet analyst were destroyed prematurely.²¹

The advocates of rural industrial production cite potential gains for the economy as a whole as a result of better utilization of agricultural labor resources, in addition to reduced seasonal unemployment in agriculture and increased incomes for collective farmers. It is possible that a greater quantity of agricultural commodities could be made available at a lower cost as the result of the higher productivity of a stable agricultural labor force and greater efficiency in food processing on the farms. If the facilities for producing consumer goods were established successfully on the farms, the critical shortages of such goods for the agricultural population could be reduced somewhat and more consumer goods could be made available to the non-agricultural population as well.

²¹ M. Vasilenko and S. Kolesnev, "Problems of Utilization of Labor Resources in the Countryside," *Problems of Economics*, vol. 9, no. 3, January, 1967, p. 19.

In addition, if the expansion of the consumer goods industries could be accomplished successfully in rural areas, this dissemination would not add to the housing shortages, congestion and other problems facing the large cities. Obviously, there are limits on the extent to which industrial production can be expanded in the countryside—as the ill-fated backyard steel furnaces in China showed so clearly. However, the limited expansion of food processing and light industrial production on Soviet collectives and state farms does seem to have considerable potential for achieving a more efficient utilization of rural labor resources while raising the incomes of agricultural workers.

Since the 1917 Revolution, the economic problems of the Soviet Union have become increasingly complex and interrelated, and greater economic sophistication will be required to deal with them successfully. In the agricultural sphere, such sophistication has been lacking, as witness the excessive zeal of the forced collectivization drive and the harsh restrictions on the agricultural sector under Stalin, as well as the consistent failure of Khrushchev's various campaigns and administrative reforms. While the current leadership has realized significant gains in the agricultural sector with its more balanced and consistent approach, changes in the institutional, administrative and financial arrangements for Soviet agriculture may not be sufficient to achieve maximum efficiency and the leadership's goals of higher dietary standards and agricultural self-sufficiency.

SOVIET AIMS IN EAST EUROPE

(Continued from page 211)

parallel any new United States policy in the area, aside from the tacit acceptance by the United States of Soviet hegemony there. Consequently, although the new *Ostpolitik* has been cautiously encouraged by the United States and the West, West Germany is both vulnerable and isolated as she dickers with the Soviet Union over the kind of role that she can play in East Europe.

Although the occupation of Czechoslovakia effectively nullified the initial successes of the old *Ostpolitik* and the Brezhnev Doctrine ensured that it could not be resumed in its existing form, the Soviet Union remained aware that the West German state, with its growing economy and prosperity, would continue to be an attraction to East Europe. Consequently, instead of erecting a Chinese wall between West Germany and East Europe, Soviet leaders searched for a formula that would allow East Europe to exploit West Germany's economic wealth without allowing West German economic contacts to become political and diplomatic footholds. This policy required consummate sophistication and required West German cooperation, since it involved nothing less than a Soviet influence in the refashioning of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*. Willy Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* is then essentially a compromise growing out of West Germany's awareness that Moscow will not countenance any alteration in the political, territorial or military status quo in that area, and Moscow's acceptance of the reality of West Germany's powerful economy and its magnetic attraction for East Europe.

The current Soviet policy toward Bonn's *Ostpolitik* is thus the product of changing and conflicting Soviet perceptions of West Germany's potential for exploitation in East Europe, combined with shifting modifications in West Germany's attitudes and approaches. A close study of the Soviet press during this period suggests the existence of important differences within the Soviet elites on how Moscow should respond and react to German initiatives.

The initial pattern of the *Ostpolitik*, as mentioned earlier, concentrated on developing direct economic, diplomatic and cultural ties with the countries of East Europe. This policy apparently met with the unanimous disapproval of the Soviet leadership in the spring and summer of 1968, although sharp

factional divisions developed over precisely how to counter the *Ostpolitik*. The upshot was, successively, inertia, vacillation, warning, threats, compromise and, finally, military occupation.¹¹ It became clear that the Soviet leadership perceived direct relations between West Germany and the countries of East Europe as a serious threat—not necessarily to Soviet security or even to the independence of the countries of East Europe—but to Soviet hegemony in the region and to the socio-political systems ("socialism") there. The establishment of West German economic, cultural and diplomatic ties with the people's democracies carried potential political import of unknown dimensions—hence, the singling out of West Germany as the main culprit in the Czech drama of 1968.

In wading through Soviet rhetoric, one should pay little attention to the specific charges levelled against Bonn, since it should be remembered that less than two years after this avalanche of abuse, Moscow and Bonn became involved in prolonged negotiations that resulted in a non-aggression treaty involving the renunciation of force in the settlement of disputes, and West German acceptance of the juridical, military and territorial status quo in East Europe, including the existence of the German Democratic Republic in its present form—at least until possible reunification at some remote date.¹²

As a temporary measure, the Brezhnev Doctrine must be judged a success in terms of Moscow's position as a global and as a regional power. It has compelled the United States to abandon whatever residual elements of the old "rollback" and "liberation" policies remained and virtually to jettison its new policies of "bridge building." For all practical purposes, the United States now accepts the Central-East European status quo and tacitly recognizes that the East European region is immune from outside interference. Similarly, the Brezhnev Doctrine has compelled West Germany to revise its *Ostpolitik* to accord with Soviet demands. In return for an agreement allowing German economic contacts with East Europe, Bonn has renounced the use of force in settling dis-

¹¹ V. V. Aspaturian, "The Aftermath of the Czech Invasion," *Current History*, November, 1968.

¹² For the text of the treaty see pp. 238ff. of this issue.

putes, abandoned all claims to the Sudeten territories, accepted the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish border, recognized East Germany as a separate state under international law and, in effect, recognized Soviet rights as clarified in the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Brezhnev Doctrine has also complicated Peking's options in utilizing East Europe as a lever against Moscow or, rather, it has made it virtually impossible for the East European countries to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict to their advantage. Peking is being squeezed out of the world Communist movement, and the Warsaw Pact may become an anti-Chinese alliance.

The Brezhnev Doctrine constitutes a hermetic seal, which renders the countries of East Europe immune to political, ideological and military penetration, while allowing limited cultural and economic contacts. The course of liberalization has been arrested in East Europe, but the forces that impelled it remain intact and may later be revived. Similarly, any immediate hope that the other countries of East Europe could imitate Rumania's developing autonomy in foreign affairs is being frustrated.

Yet East Europe remains brittle, as resentments and frustrations continue to mount and fester within the suffocating atmosphere of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Germany remains a "political dwarf," but the dynamism of her people, her economy and her culture will eventually find a political outlet. In return for limited economic contacts with East Europe, closely supervised by Moscow to prevent any possible spill-over, West Germany runs enormous risks. She may give juridical sanction to the division of Germany and leave the status of West Berlin unclarified. Most important, there is the danger of Soviet political penetration feeding back over economic agreements.

Chancellor Brandt, apparently, is confident that irrepressible forces will break through whatever synthetic safeguards Moscow has erected to block both the nonviolent liberalization and the liberation of East Europe and East Germany. Only time will tell whether the new German-Soviet agreements

will preserve, expand, or diminish the Soviet zone of influence in East-Central Europe.

SOVIET-WEST GERMAN TREATY

(Continued from page 238)

Done at Moscow on 12 August, 1970 in two originals, one each in the German and Russian languages, whereby the text of each is equally binding.

WEST GERMAN LETTER TO GROMYKO

In connection with today's signing of the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is honored to ascertain that this treaty does not stand in contradiction to the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a condition of peace in Europe in which the German nation attains its unity again in free self-determination.

NOTE FROM WEST GERMANY TO WESTERN POWERS

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is honored, in connection with the impending signature of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to impart the following:

The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs has elaborated in connection with the negotiations the standpoint of the Federal Government with regard to the rights and responsibilities of the four powers concerning Germany as a whole and Berlin.

Since a peace treaty remains outstanding, both sides have concluded therefrom that the intended treaty does not affect the rights and responsibilities of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs has declared in this connection:

The question of the rights of the four powers does not have any connection with the treaty which the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intend to conclude and will not be affected by it.

The Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has declared in this connection:

The question of the rights of the four powers was not a subject of the negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Government concluded therefrom that this question should not be discussed.

The question of the rights of the four powers will not be affected, either, by the treaty which the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany intend to conclude. This is the position of the Soviet Government on this question.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of August, 1970, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

Aug. 14—A 4-month round of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on strategic arms limitation ends in Vienna. A joint communiqué issued by the chief U.S. and Soviet delegates announces that talks will be resumed in Helsinki, Finland, on November 2, 1970.

Aug. 16—*The New York Times* reports that the U.S. has offered to give up its anti-ballistic missile defense system (ABM) if the Soviet Union will agree to limit the number of its SS-9 offensive missiles and give up its own missile defenses.

Latin America

Aug. 11—*The New York Times* reports that representatives of 14 Latin American and Caribbean countries, meeting in Peru this month, have declared that all countries have the right to claim as much of the sea and the seabed near their coasts as they need to protect their present and potential offshore wealth; 6 countries disagreed with the conclusions of the 14.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Intl, United Nations; Iraq, Israel, Singapore, U.A.R.*)

Aug. 1—Israeli planes attack Egyptian positions along the Suez Canal; artillery fire is exchanged along the waterway.

Aug. 4—Israel delivers to the United States her formal acceptance of the June 19, 1970, U.S. proposal for a 90-day cease-fire with concurrent peace talks. Israeli Premier Golda Meir, in a report to the Israeli Parliament (*Knesset*), says that her reluctance to accept the proposal gave way after she received military and political

assurances from U.S. President Richard M. Nixon. (See *Current History*, September, 1970, pp. 183ff.)

Aug. 5—A conference of foreign and defense ministers of 5 Arab nations opens in Tripoli, Libya. Iraq and Algeria boycott the talks to protest the Egyptian and Jordanian acceptance of the U.S. peace proposal.

Aug. 6—The 5-nation Arab conference, attended by delegations from the U.A.R., Jordan, Syria, the Sudan and Libya, concludes.

Aug. 7—The cease-fire goes into effect at the Egyptian-Israeli front along the Suez Canal; the cease-fire will last until November 5. Israel and Egypt will police each other's observance of the cease-fire assisted by United Nations observers.

A spokesman for the Central Committee of the Arab commando movement says that the commando group will not observe the cease-fire and will escalate its activities "until the liberation of Palestine has been achieved."

Aug. 9—An Israeli military spokesman reports the bombing of guerrilla bases in Lebanon by the Israeli Air Force; Israeli forces are engaged in ground combat with guerrilla infiltrators from Syria in the Golan Heights section of Israeli-occupied Syria.

Aug. 12—According to U.S. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey, the United States is checking reports received from Israel that Soviet low-altitude missiles were installed on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal 4 hours after the cease-fire began.

Aug. 14—Israeli jets attack Jordanian Army posts. Israeli spokesmen claim that the Jordanian Army is assisting terrorists in their attacks on Israeli civilians.

Aug. 17—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban charges that the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. are continuing to construct missile sites and to deploy weapons close to the Suez Canal, in violation of the terms of the cease-fire. The August 7 cease-fire agreement prohibits new construction within 32 miles of either side of the Suez Canal.

Aug. 18—The U.S. informs Israel that the evidence of Egyptian violations of the cease-fire is not conclusive enough to delay peace negotiations.

Aug. 20—The Israeli foreign ministry announces that it has notified the United Nations that Israel is ready to begin negotiations with the U.A.R. and Jordan on a settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Jordanian King Hussein arrives in the U.A.R. for 3 days of conferences with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser on current efforts to reach a Middle East settlement.

Aug. 21—U.S. State Department spokesman McCloskey announces that the U.S. will continue its reconnaissance flights over the Suez Canal despite Egyptian objections.

An Israeli military spokesman declares that Israel has complained to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization about Egypt's continuing build-up of missile sites in the truce zone along the Suez Canal.

Aug. 23—The Israeli Cabinet names Foreign Minister Abba Eban as Israel's chief negotiator at the proposed Middle East peace talks. The U.A.R. and Jordan have named their representatives to the U.N. as their negotiators.

Aug. 24—An Egyptian official claims that Israel has violated the terms of the cease-fire by building military roads and fortifications in the Suez Canal zone.

Aug. 25—At U.N. headquarters in New York, discussions on the Middle East begin as representatives from Israel, Jordan and the U.A.R. meet separately with Gunnar V. Jarring, the U.N. special representative for the Middle East.

Aug. 28—Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev asks all sides for an

"honest observance" of the cease-fire.

The 111-member Palestinian National Council categorically rejects current peace negotiations in the Middle East.

Aug. 31—U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says the U.S. is shipping arms to Israel during the cease-fire to maintain the arms balance.

Israel complains for the 8th time of Egyptian violations of the cease-fire.

Organization of African Unity

Aug. 24—Speaking at the opening session of a conference of African foreign ministers in Ethiopia, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie deplores Britain's consideration of a plan to resume arms sales to South Africa. Nigeria is attending the conference for the first time in 2 years.

United Nations

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 7—In a report to the Security Council, Secretary General U Thant states that the Jarring mission in the Middle East has been reactivated.

Aug. 10—The President of the Congo, Lieutenant General Joseph D. Mobutu, pays an official visit to the United Nations.

War in Indochina

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 2—North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces attack the Cambodian towns of Kompong Thom and Skoun.

A representative of the pro-Communist Laotian Pathet Lao presents a letter from Laotian Prince Souphanouvong, Pathet Lao leader, to Laotian Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma. The letter contains new peace proposals, but its contents are not divulged.

Aug. 3—David K. E. Bruce, chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks on Indochina, arrives in Paris.

Aug. 4—Cambodian military headquarters announces that enemy troops have been driven from Kompong Thom.

Aug. 5—*The New York Times* reports that U.S. planes provided direct support for

Cambodian troops on the outskirts of Skoun today.

Sim Var, a member of Cambodian Premier Lon Nol's 6-man Political Council and a deputy, says that the Lon Nol government can last only 6 months without significant military and economic aid from the U.S.

Aug. 8—The military command in Cambodia announces that Cambodian forces have retaken Skoun with support from "aircraft of a friendly nation."

Aug. 16—North Vietnamese forces attack 5 allied bases near the demilitarized zone in Vietnam; U.S. B-52's stage the heaviest raids in the northern section of South Vietnam since August, 1968.

Aug. 17—Laotian Prince Tiao Souk Vongsak, envoy from the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, says that his talks with representatives of the Laotian government are at a stalemate.

Aug. 18—The Australian government announces that it intends to withdraw a battalion of troops from South Vietnam but will offer "defense aid" of 3.3 million Australian dollars to South Vietnam.

Aug. 20—Cambodian forces battle to repulse an attack by Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops about 7 miles from the capital city of Pnompenh.

Sir Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand, says that New Zealand will withdraw 144 of the 550 men she has in South Vietnam before the end of the year.

Aug. 26—Xuan Thuy, chief North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris peace talks, returns to Paris.

Aug. 27—Bruce attends the 81st session of the Paris peace talks; Thuy fails to attend.

Aug. 28—In Pnompenh, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew tells Lon Nol that the U.S. will send funds and arms but will not supply troops to defend Lon Nol's government in Cambodia.

A U.S. State Department press officer reports that Thailand has notified the U.S. that she plans to withdraw her 11,000-man force from South Vietnam.

Aug. 29—Thai Foreign Minister Thanat

Koman says that Agnew has pledged to "leave no stone unturned" to make sure that the Nixon Doctrine is not weakened by U.S. critics.

Aug. 30—In Honolulu, Agnew says that more than 50 per cent of the Communist combat troops in Cambodia "have been eliminated."

Warsaw Pact

Aug. 20—Warsaw Pact leaders, meeting in Moscow, praise the Soviet-West German treaty signed August 12 and promise to strengthen the security of Europe. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

BOLIVIA

Aug. 4—President Alfredo Ovando Candia receives the resignation of his Cabinet after a 3-week crisis.

Aug. 28—10 bombs explode in La Paz; targets include the Defense Ministry, the U.S. consulate and the Soviet mission's building.

Aug. 30—A transport strike which began July 27 cripples La Paz.

BRAZIL

Aug. 4—The military government orders swift action to halt the slaying of petty criminals by vigilante groups and to ensure faster police investigations and trials for political crimes.

BURMA

Aug. 23—It is reported by *The New York Times* that a border region of northeastern Burma has become a battleground for conflicts between government forces and rebels supported by Chinese Communists.

CAMBODIA

(See also *China, Czechoslovakia; Intl. War in Indochina*)

Aug. 28—Following a visit with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky in South Vietnam, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew arrives in Pnompenh, Cambodia, to confer with officials of the Lon Nol government.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

- Aug. 1—According to *The New York Times*, evidence of a reorganization of the State Council, i.e., the Cabinet, has appeared in stories in the Chinese Communist press.
- Aug. 2—A Rumanian military delegation concludes an official 11-day visit.
- Aug. 6—A Sudanese delegation headed by Sudan's President Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiry begins an official visit.
- Aug. 12—Leonid F. Ilyichev, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, arrives in Peking to serve as the new delegate at the talks with Communist China on Sino-Soviet border problems.
- Aug. 17—*Hsinhua*, the official news agency, reports that Communist China has signed an agreement with the Cambodian government-in-exile of Prince Norodom Sihanouk; under the terms of the agreement, the Chinese Communists will supply free military aid to Sihanouk's government-in-exile.

CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)

- Aug. 26—U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew arrives in Taiwan where he confers with President Chiang Kai-shek.

COLOMBIA

- Aug. 7—Misael Pastrana Borrero is sworn in as the new President, succeeding Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

CUBA

- Aug. 7—*The New York Times* reports that Chile and Cuba have signed an agreement to exchange television programs.
- Aug. 21—A senior naval staff officer, Major Angel Cheveco Hernandez, is appointed to the new Cabinet post of Minister of Merchant Marine and Ports; military officers now hold 9 key posts in the Cuban Cabinet.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Aug. 10—The Cambodian Embassy in Prague is seized by a Cambodian diplomat and a group of Cambodian students on

behalf of ousted Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

- Aug. 14—The U.S. Embassy reports that the Czechoslovak secret police have been holding an American charged with espionage.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- Aug. 16—President Joaquin Balaguer begins his 2d 4-year term.

ECUADOR

- Aug. 16—The government announces the devaluation, effective tomorrow, of the sucre from 18.42 to 24.75 to the U.S. dollar.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

- Aug. 10—*Neues Deutschland*, the East German party newspaper, reports that Walter Ulbricht, the head of state, has appealed to some North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and to some nonaligned Western countries to grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany; the names of the countries are not revealed.
- Aug. 14—East Germany asks the U.S., Britain and France for recognition; the move follows the August 12 signing of a nonaggression treaty by the Soviet Union and West Germany.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

GHANA

- Aug. 31—Former Chief Justice Edward Akufo-Addo becomes President, after the first election since the military ousted President Kwame Nkrumah in 1966.

GREECE

- Aug. 10—George Georgalas, Under Secretary of Information, announces that about 500 political prisoners held since April, 1967, will be released in the next 2 weeks.

GUYANA

- Aug. 15—Prime Minister Forbes Burnham

announces the intention of the government to control not less than 51 per cent of the country's national resources, especially minerals and forests; the government will begin negotiations soon with 2 foreign companies that produced 4.7 million tons of bauxite last year.

INDIA

Aug. 3—Swaran Singh, the Minister of External Affairs, announces that India's trade mission to East Germany will be upgraded to a consulate general office; the East German trade mission to India will also be upgraded to the consular level. The move does not constitute full diplomatic recognition of East Germany.

INDONESIA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

IRAQ

(See also *Libya*)

Aug. 17—Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian commando leader, confers with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad.

Aug. 18—The Baghdad radio reports that Iraq has placed her 12,000 troops in Jordan at the disposal of the Palestinian commandos.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 4—The Gahal faction, a nationalist right-wing group, withdraws its 6 ministers from the Cabinet to protest Israel's acceptance of the U.S. proposal for a 90-day cease-fire.

ITALY

Aug. 1—Foreign Minister Aldo Moro arrives in Beirut where he confers with Saleh Massaed Buysir, Foreign Minister of Libya, on Libya's confiscation of Italian property in Libya last month.

Aug. 2—In Beirut, Moro confers with Lebanese President Charles Helou.

Aug. 4—The Christian Democrats, Republicans, Socialists and Social Democrats approve a platform drafted by Emilio

Colombo, the Premier-designate; the agreement paves the way for the formation of a new government.

Aug. 6—The 27-member Cabinet of the new coalition government of Premier Colombo is sworn in; the Cabinet consists of 16 Christian Democrats, 6 Socialists, 4 Social Democrats and 1 Republican.

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 29—Palestinian guerrillas battle Jordanian troops in the second day of street fighting.

KENYA

Aug. 4—The foreign ministers of 4 Commonwealth states, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania, meet to work out a common position on the possible resumption of arms sales to South Africa by Britain.

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Aug. 22—An editorial in *Rodong Shinmun*, the North Korean Workers' party's official newspaper, rejects South Korean President Chung Hee Park's proposal for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *North Korea*)

Aug. 13—Defense Minister Jung Nae Hiuk says that the South Korean government is willing to begin talks about the withdrawal of U.S. troops if the U.S. will assure the modernization of the South Korean armed forces.

Aug. 15—President Chung Hee Park says that South Korea will be willing to take steps toward the peaceful reunification of Korea if North Korea will renounce the use of force.

Aug. 24—In Seoul, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew promises that the U.S. will provide funds for the modernization of the South Korean armed forces; he announces that a U.S. wing of F-4 Phantom jets will be shifted from Japan to South Korea.

LAOS

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

LEBANON

(See also *Italy*)

Aug. 17—In a 50-to-49 vote, the Parliament elects Minister of Economy Suleiman Franjeh to be the new President of Lebanon; Franjeh will take office on September 23. He succeeds Charles Helou.

LIBYA

(See also *Italy*)

Aug. 5—Premier Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya returns from Iraq after an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Iraqi regime to take part in a conference of the defense and foreign ministers of the Arab nations.

MALAYSIA

Aug. 30—Prince Abdul Rahman announces that he will retire as Prime Minister September 21; Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Razak will succeed him.

MOROCCO

Aug. 29—Official returns reveal that King Hassan II polled a majority of over 90 per cent in the parliamentary elections that ended yesterday. 219 of the 240 members of the Chamber of Representatives support the King.

NIGERIA

Aug. 15—A decree signed by the head of government, Major General Yakubu Gowon, declares that all government employees who supported the Biafran secessionist movement will be dismissed or forced to retire.

OMAN

Aug. 9—Sultan Qabus bin Said, in a radio address, outlines sweeping reforms; he changes the name of the country from Muscat and Oman to the Sultanate of Oman, invites exiles to return, and asserts his intention to end the isolation of his country and to modernize the government. The former Sultan, Said bin Taimur, was overthrown July 23.

POLAND

Aug. 24—Yao Kuang, the new Communist Chinese Ambassador to Poland, arrives in Warsaw; his predecessor was recalled in 1967.

SINGAPORE

Aug. 17—A 3-man delegation from Al Fatah, the Palestinian guerrilla organization, arrives in Singapore for an official visit.

SPAIN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

TURKEY

Aug. 9—The government announces the devaluation of the lire from 9 lire to the U.S. dollar to 15 lire to the dollar. Premier Suleyman Demirel also announces increases in prices of agricultural products and increased taxes on sugar and fuel.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Aug. 12—In Moscow, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin sign a 5-article treaty of non-aggression and cooperation which affirms the status quo in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western boundary. The 2 powers agree to "regard the frontiers of all the states in Europe today and in the future as inviolable. . . ." The treaty must be ratified by the Supreme Soviet and the West German *Bundestag*. (For the text of the treaty, see pp. 238ff.)

Aug. 27—Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, after discussions with Soviet leaders, announces that the U.S.S.R. has agreed to allow the Indonesian government 30 years to pay an \$800-million debt.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Aug. 23—Foreign ministry officials report that the U.A.R. and Iran have agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

Aug. 26—Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian com-

mando leader, who has been meeting with Egyptian officials since his arrival in Cairo on August 24, has his 2d meeting with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

UNITED KINGDOM

(See also *U.S., Military*)

Aug. 6—A Foreign Office spokesman announces that on behalf of the governments in the Bahama Islands and Bermuda, Great Britain has expressed concern to the U.S. about the proposed U.S. dumping of lethal nerve gas in the Atlantic Ocean.

British Territories

The Bahamas

Aug. 15—The Cabinet votes to lodge a protest against the U.S. plan to dump nerve gas into the Atlantic Ocean; the protest is delivered to British and U.S. officials.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights and Race Relations

(See also *U.S., Supreme Court; North Vietnam*)

Aug. 6—Attorney General John N. Mitchell files suit in a U.S. district court against Samuel J. Lefrak and the Lefrak Organization. The Justice Department claims that the Lefrak Organization has practiced racial discrimination in the renting of 21,000 apartments in New York.

Aug. 7—The Justice Department files suit against the state of Texas and 26 school districts within the state to compel desegregation of the Texas schools in the academic year 1970–1971.

Aug. 14—Police face sniper fire in the South Side of Chicago, Illinois; recently, there have been almost nightly attacks on police in the Negro areas of Chicago.

Aug. 16—A Chicago detective, James A. Alfano, ambushed on August 14, dies. He is the 4th Chicago policeman to be murdered in a black neighborhood since mid-June.

Aug. 19—The Internal Revenue Service announces that 11 white private schools in

Mississippi that deny admission to Negroes have been removed from the list of schools eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions.

Aug. 27—A federal court orders a Fort Pierce, Florida, cemetery, restricted to whites, to accept for burial the body of a black soldier killed in Vietnam.

Aug. 31—More than 200 school districts in 11 Southern states comply with federal orders to desegregate public schools; no violence is reported but widespread litigation has begun. (See also *Supreme Court.*)

Economy

Aug. 7—The Labor Department report for the month of July shows an unemployment rate of 5 per cent; there has been a particularly high rate of unemployment for men in the 20–24-year age group.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Disarmament, Middle East, War in Indochina; South Korea*)

Aug. 4—Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, says that there has been no change in President Richard Nixon's policy, announced on June 30, of confining U.S. air activity in Cambodia to attacks on enemy troops and supplies which endanger U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Ziegler concedes that such attacks could also be of tactical benefit to Cambodian government forces.

President Joseph D. Mobutu of the Congo visits President Nixon at the White House.

Aug. 6—Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Gregorio López Bravo, the Spanish Foreign Minister, sign an agreement providing for continuing U.S. use of military bases in Spain. The 5-year agreement calls for "reciprocal defense support" and requires the U.S. to provide grants, loans and military equipment to Spain.

Aug. 7—President Nixon announces that he is sending former astronaut Frank Borman on a mission to seek the release of U.S. prisoners of war in Southeast Asia and

more humane treatment for those prisoners who remain in enemy hands.

Aug. 13—*The New York Times* reports that under the terms of the pact signed by Spain and the U.S. on August 6, the United States cannot use the 3 air bases in Spain for military operations related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Aug. 14—Robert J. McCloskey, State Department press spokesman, says that the U.S. and Thailand have reached a tentative agreement on U.S. aid to troops being recruited in Thailand for service in Cambodia.

Aug. 20—In Mexico, President Nixon and Mexican President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz announce that they have agreed on a resolution of all border disputes and on the machinery to prevent such disputes in the future.

Aug. 21—President Nixon concludes his Mexican visit; details of the agreement on the Mexican-U.S. border dispute are made public.

Aug. 22—Vice President Spiro Agnew embarks on a trip for the President that will take him to South Korea, Thailand, South Vietnam and Nationalist China.

Aug. 23—En route to Asia, Vice President Agnew says that it would be impossible "for the Vietnamization program and the disengagement of American troops to take place if Cambodia falls."

Aug. 24—The State Department announces a \$40-million program of military assistance for Cambodia during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971; the agreement includes small arms, ammunitions, communications equipment and training funds.

Aug. 26—The transcript of a new briefing held at the Western White House on August 24 is made public; it reveals that the U.S. is prepared to join with the Soviet Union to form a 2-nation peace-keeping agency to enforce a settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Government

Aug. 1—Federal judges, except those on the Supreme Court, make public reports of

their outside earned income; income from stocks, bonds, real estate and other business holdings is not covered in the reports.

Aug. 3—At a conference on law enforcement in Denver, the President criticizes press coverage of the Manson murder trial which depicts Charles Manson as "glamorous"; he says Manson is "guilty, directly or indirectly, of eight murders without reason." The President later issues a statement in effect retracting his remarks.

Aug. 4—The Senate approves an appropriation bill of \$18 billion for miscellaneous federal agencies including the Veterans Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The measure, previously approved by the House of Representatives, now goes to the President.

Aug. 6—In a 339-to-29 vote, the House approves a measure to convert the Post Office Department to an independent government agency; the bill, which now goes to the President, also raises postal employee wages by 8 per cent.

Aug. 10—The President sends the first annual report of the Council on Environmental Quality to Congress. The report, which calls for the enactment of proposals already before Congress and further research into the causes and effects of pollution, also recommends a national land-use policy to balance available land resources with a growing population.

The President signs a bill extending unemployment insurance coverage to an additional 4.7 million workers, including employees of firms employing one or more workers, additional agricultural processing workers, employees of non-profit organizations, employees of state, county and municipal institutions and some Americans working abroad.

Attorney General Mitchell issues guidelines to the Justice Department limiting the discretion of government lawyers to subpoena newsmen to testify in criminal cases.

Aug. 11—The Federal Bureau of Investigation apprehends the Reverend Daniel J.

Berrigan, who was convicted of destroying draft records to protest the Vietnam war; in April, 1970, the fugitive Jesuit priest refused to surrender to serve his sentence.

President Nixon vetoes 2 appropriation bills, a \$4.4-billion measure for the Office of Education and an \$18.1-billion bill for various federal agencies including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He terms both bills inflationary.

The President announces his intention to nominate Miles K. Kirkpatrick as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.

Aug. 12—The President signs the bill which creates the United States Postal Service.

President Nixon signs legislation raising payments to disabled veterans by about 11 per cent.

The F.B.I. issues its annual report on crime in 1969, revealing that the crime rate rose 10.6 per cent over 1968 and 148 per cent over the 1960 rate.

The 62d annual conference of governors concludes at Osage Beach, Missouri.

Aug. 13—Voting 203 to 195, the House fails to pass the \$18.1-billion appropriation bill for various federal agencies over the President's veto. The House votes, 289 to 114, to override the presidential veto of a \$4.4-billion Office of Education bill; the measure now goes to the Senate.

In a 216-to-153 vote, the House approves and sends to the President a measure that gives the President the authority to freeze wages and prices temporarily; the bill also contains a provision for establishing standard cost accounting procedures on defense contracts.

Aug. 14—The Federal Communications Commission declares that, in view of the extensive use that President Nixon made of television to defend his conduct of the war in Indochina, the networks must now provide prime time for the critics of his war policy to reply.

Aug. 17—The President signs a bill which authorizes him to freeze wages and prices.

Aug. 18—The Senate votes to override the presidential veto of the \$4.4-billion education bill, which now becomes law.

Aug. 19—Lee A. DuBridge resigns as Science Adviser to the President; Edward D. David, Jr., will be his successor.

The Administration sends the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Senate for its approval; the protocol prohibits the nations ratifying it from initiating the use of chemical or biological weapons in war.

The President nominates John N. Irwin 2d to become Under Secretary of State.

The Justice Department files suits in U.S. district courts in New Hampshire and North Carolina to provide tests of the constitutionality of the law extending voting rights to 18-year-old citizens, banning literary tests and limiting residency requirements for voting.

Aug. 20—The Democratic National Committee and the Columbia Broadcasting System appeal to the Federal Communications Commission to reconsider its ruling of August 18 that C.B.S. must provide a matching 25 minutes of prime time to the Republicans to reply to the Democrats' "loyal opposition" broadcast of last month.

Aug. 28—President Nixon asks the Senate Finance Committee to report out his bill providing for a Family Assistance Program but says he will accept an amendment providing for a year of "field testing" before the full program becomes operational.

Labor

Aug. 15—At a convention in Denver, Colorado, delegates of the American Federation of Government Employees, which represents about 600,000 federal employees, delete the no-strike clause from their constitution.

Military

Aug. 6—The Defense Department announces a draft call of 39,000 men for the last 4 months of 1970; this will bring the year's total to 163,500 men.

Aug. 7—Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, announces a new policy that will affect half the Reserve Officer Training Corps graduates who are expected to enter active service in the fiscal year 1971.

Those affected will spend 3 to 6 months on active duty instead of the usual 2 years.

Aug. 16—The 3-man Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upholds the ruling of a lower court allowing the Army to proceed with plans to dump concrete vaults containing nerve gas into the Atlantic Ocean 280 miles from Florida and 150 miles from the nearest of the Bahama Islands.

Aug. 18—An obsolete Liberty ship with a cargo of nerve gas sealed in concrete vaults is sunk in the Atlantic Ocean.

Aug. 31—The Defense Department announces that on August 28 the Army successfully staged an interception of one of its own ballistic missiles above the atmosphere.

Politics

Aug. 25—Unofficial returns in the Democratic gubernatorial primary in Arkansas indicate that former Governor Orville E. Faubus is in the lead, but a run-off in September will be necessary.

Supreme Court

Aug. 17—The United States brings suit against the states of Arizona and Idaho, asking the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of the law which grants the vote to 18-year-old citizens and outlaws literacy requirements.

Aug. 25—Chief Justice Warren E. Burger denies petitions from 4 school districts in North Carolina and Florida to delay school desegregation until the Supreme Court rules on the issue of busing.

Aug. 31—The Chief Justice announces that on October 12, the first working day of its fall session, the Court will begin hearings on a broad range of questions concerning school desegregation.

URUGUAY

Aug. 5—The third message from the Tupamaros guerrilla organization about the release of a kidnapped American official and a Brazilian diplomat is presented to President Jorge Pacheco Areco; the message

demands the release of all political prisoners in exchange for the kidnapped victims.

Aug. 6—President Pacheco Areco refuses to release political prisoners in exchange for the kidnapped hostages.

Aug. 10—The body of the U.S. adviser to the Uruguayan police is found 11 days after he was kidnapped by the Tupamaros.

VATICAN

Aug. 14—Officials announce that full ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations will be restored with Yugoslavia.

VENEZUELA

Aug. 27—President Rafael Caldera reports that the government cannot open primary and secondary public schools September 15 because of a lack of funds. The Ministry of Education has reported that because of the rising birth rate, 307 new schools and 6,140 additional teachers are required.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Aug. 18—A delegation from the U.S. Black Panther party attends a North Vietnamese celebration of an "international day of solidarity with the black people of the United States." The delegation is headed by Black Panther Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)


(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Aug. 28—Under the land-reform program set up 5 months ago, President Nguyen Van Thieu issues the first land titles to several hundred peasants. The program calls for the distribution of more than 5 million acres of rice land to about one million peasants.

Aug. 31—Unofficial returns show that anti-government Buddhists have won 10 of the 30 Senate seats contested in yesterday's election.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See *Vatican*)



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